已删除
137 个评论
>>組織新政府的人必須相信並將政府建立在憲政民主架構上如果這件事辦不成，那也太差了因為一百多年前北洋政府...
问题是在加速主义的语境下，中共崩溃了，加速主义理论怎么解决这个问题呢？怎么让“组织新政府的人必须相信并将政府建立在宪政民主架构上”呢？一百多年前是一百多年前，现在是现在，没有什么证据证明一百多年前能做的事今天或未来就一定能做到不是吗？难道到时候吐槽几句“你们太差了”，双手一摊就不管了？
>>问题是在加速主义的语境下，中共崩溃了，加速主义理论怎么解决这个问题呢？怎么让“组织新政府的人必须相信...
中共有系統壓制任何可能取而代之的組織，並大規模洗腦，改朝換代過程確實會造成問題
不過讓中共繼續做更是不會有改良機會的
只能說有識之士必須努力
>>你清算砍头别人，你也可能日后被别人砍。不信？不信你就对比下英国和法国的革命，以史为鉴！我对你的大论点完全支持，但对你支持weee这种幼稚论点非常失望。你举了例子，我也举两个例子：符坚的不杀大仁义和清军入关对不剃头不合作的反对派全杀光
>>我对你的大论点完全支持，但对你支持weee这种幼稚论点非常失望。你举了例子，我也举两个例子：符坚的不...
我并没有支持weee不清算。我意思清算只是实现民主之后的一个结果，而不应该是实现民主的目的。
比如其实我认为邓由于没有全面否定毛路线带来了很多负面影响，虽然从邓的立场依然可以理解他为什么这么做。
>>我问你的是日本天皇和英国皇室都没有被审判，怎么他们没有变成独裁啊？你不是说不审判就会独裁吗？
那时候日本的实际统治集团军部已经被审判清算，英国独裁的查理一世也被砍头，后面立的国王都没有实权，你偷换什么概念？
>>意思是加速有機會好轉減速無機會好轉
我想搞清楚的就是加速崩溃之后如何好转？民智未开，人心未变，好一点的情况就是野心家和当地势力勾结掌控经济民生，更糟糕的是地方军政大员拥兵自立，这就是我看到的可能性。诸君如何努力才能走向宪政？那种情况下的努力比今天更有可能达成宪政？我不这么认为。
>>其實按照日本和德國二次大戰之後的做法是:公職追放,永久不得再造公務員(如果涉及下一代),不發放公務員...
虽然我不喜欢毛泽东，但是毛的统战能力还是很强的。他至少在当时保证不清算其他对立势力的人，还搞了个政协把一些人养起来。这样可以减少很多很多的抵抗势力，有利于他获得胜利。
而你们设想的民主，是不依赖任何共产党内部的力量，把几千万共产党人都搞得很惨。如果把几千万人背后的家人也算上，那就是几亿人，即使民主投票都有可能占大多数。
这个反抗力量会有多大，你凭什么认为你有可能赢？而毛就聪明得多，用一招统战直接减少了大量的抵抗，虽然有些人后来还是遭受了清算，但是他赢了
>>can't agree more~敵人的敵人分分鐘是你更大的敵人。
虽然我不喜欢毛泽东，但是毛的统战能力还是很强的。他至少在当时保证不清算其他对立势力的人，还搞了个政协把一些人养起来。这样可以减少很多很多的抵抗势力，有利于他获得胜利。
而你们设想的民主，是不依赖任何共产党内部的力量，把几千万共产党人都搞得很惨。如果把几千万人背后的家人也算上，那就是几亿人，即使民主投票都有可能占大多数
这个反抗力量会有多大，你凭什么认为你有可能赢？而毛就聪明得多，用一招统战直接减少了大量的抵抗，拉拢一切可以拉拢的力量。虽然有些人后来还是遭受了清算，但是他赢了。
你们就这种思路永远斗不赢共产党
我们这帮弟兄的理想是杀到北京，躲了鸟位；而你们听床党的理想是期盼圣君，老老实实做顺民。所以你我之间是做不了朋友的。
>>虽然我不喜欢毛泽东，但是毛的统战能力还是很强的。他至少在当时保证不清算其他对立势力的人，还搞了个政协...
所以我任何中國人所推動的民主抱極大懷疑態度!
為什麼?正正就是毛澤東這一類中國人式詭詐方法, 大家以為自己不是受害者,結果大家終點是文化大革命,所有都變成加害者+加受害者!
"这样可以减少很多很多的抵抗势力，有利于他获得胜利。"<-------我們到底要容忍罪惡和逃避自己責任到什麼程度?事情已經70年,沒一家不死一人,無一家不害人,無一人不是滿手鮮血!
你仍然覺得公職追放是太重?他們失業是有問題,所以會令他們難以接受?
既然如此要這種人支持做什麼?
民主社會最重要一元素正正就是對公義和責任的追求,至少對於正確的事情有共識!
在中國人世界民主就變成中國共產黨的民主,或者就是你這一類,民主變成做生意一樣,統一戰線玩幻想中的交易!
你和共產黨有什麼分別?不如繼續被共產黨統治就算吧!
所以中國"民主",或進一步說中國社會的解放一定不是來自民運和反賊,或者任何中國內部人士引發,必然來外來勢力引發!
看一看"二十大後中國前景研討會",這一類民運人士和大中華夢的文痞之間"融洽",再看一看你這一類論調,基本上沒有什麼驚喜事會發生!
看一看"二十大後中國前景研討會",這一類民運人士和大中華夢的文痞之間"融洽",再看一看你這一類論調,基本上沒有什麼驚喜事會發生!
>>中共有系統壓制任何可能取而代之的組織，並大規模洗腦，改朝換代過程確實會造成問題不過讓中共繼續做更是不...
他們始終不願意和不肯接受一個事實:大家淪落到如此境地,被玩到連狗都不如!
不是民主與否,不是自由與否,而是一開始大家對公義和正義作出絕對蔑視和輕視,對自己罪責不肯承認和離開!
永遠都是一種態度:不能得罪所有人,現在中國人不就是已經得罪全世界了嗎?
>>我对你的大论点完全支持，但对你支持weee这种幼稚论点非常失望。你举了例子，我也举两个例子：符坚的不...
你看一看偉大的習近平是如何崛起:文革一代人
連文革一代人自我反省和自我悔改都沒有,結果他們這一種僥倖的心理成為慣犯,直到今天你經歷的一切!
>>我想搞清楚的就是加速崩溃之后如何好转？民智未开，人心未变，好一点的情况就是野心家和当地势力勾结掌控经...
"那种情况下的努力比今天更有可能达成宪政？我不这么认为。"
中國人手上的社會,憲政通常是笑話!
你不如要求中國人如何成為一個現代社會公民是比較合理的基礎!
>>问题是在加速主义的语境下，中共崩溃了，加速主义理论怎么解决这个问题呢？怎么让“组织新政府的人必须相信...
"双手一摊就不管了？"
人只需要管理好他自己能力範圍內的事,超出他自己能力範圍的事和預測的事,他人沒有義務承擔!
現在我只叫我身邊朋友和香港人:和任何中國人保持距離!
>>所以我任何中國人所推動的民主抱極大懷疑態度!為什麼?正正就是毛澤東這一類中國人式詭詐方法, 大家以為...
所以如果没有外部势力干涉呢？你打算怎么办？一直做美帝灭中共的美梦？
就连朝鲜这种国家美帝都不敢动手，中国核弹那么多，美帝也不会动手，最多经济封锁
事实上美国智库之前发了一篇长文，叫更长的电报，里面就讲了对中国的政策是让习下台，而不是让中共下台。他们也很清楚，要颠覆一个有8000万人的党很困难，所以他们早就不把让共党下台作为战略目标了。文中也说的很清楚，实现民主归根结底是中国人自己的事，任何外部势力的干涉会有害于这个目标而不是有利
由此可以看出美国人很聪明很务实，而不是像你一样大讲大道理
讲你这些大道理能赢才怪了
再次强调，共产党及其家属加起来有几亿人，你要制定一个清算几亿人的政策，即使民主投票你也通不过。你指望美国人帮你通过？不好意思他们也没那么傻，就算美国人杀过来了也会采取在共产党中扶持反对派的策略，而不是像你一样要让所有“公职人员”下台
民主本来就是妥协的艺术，根本不是像你一样讲大道理，投票本来就是利益分配的一种手段，你以为民主国家的人就会像你一样人人讲大道理？而不是根据自己的立场投票？
再次强调，共产党员及其家属那么多，就算投票你也投不赢
>>所以中國"民主",或進一步說中國社會的解放一定不是來自民運和反賊,或者任何中國內部人士引發,必然來外...
美国根本就不打算推翻中共，你不过是在幻想，有任何证据证明美国打算这么做吗？
真要说利益勾兑，美国和中共的利益早就紧密捆绑了
至于什么民运人士，他们早就没什么气候了，他们自己也是外部力量。
真要成功需要的是内部力量引发的利益重新分配，而这个分配方案必须能团结大多数人
事实上那些民运人士之所以失败，也是因为他们幻想借助美国的力量推翻中共，却没想过怎么团结中国最广大的民众。想不明白这点永远不可能赢
>>所以如果没有外部势力干涉呢？你打算怎么办？一直做美帝灭中共的美梦？就连朝鲜这种国家美帝都不敢动手，中...
又出來表現中國式腦筋和閱讀理解能力!
民主本来就是妥协的艺术<-----------這一句根本是中國人創造出來,尤其是中國這一類恐懼責任和追究的社會!
其本所有民主社會的基礎只有一項開始:權力授權和權力維護,用美國國父的說法就是本傑明·富蘭克林:「選出來的君主制」
所以民主社會的本質仍然離不開公平問題和本身權力的再界定!所以你"像你一样讲大道理",基本就是海外民運那堆人一樣,用民主混飯吃,但對民主的機制和形成不願意
如果本身基礎論述和權力授權不清不楚,後果就是你這一堆垃圾:中國民主人口的民主其實是擊敗敵人的手段而已,或者是類似中國共產黨獲得政權的時候的方法一樣!
那一篇叫The Longer Telegram： Toward A New American China Policy 出自Atlantic Council
你明顯英文能力有問題!
主要是以下三點
1.The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
2. US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
3.The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
"所以他们早就不把让共党下台作为战略目标了。文中也说的很清楚，实现民主归根结底是中国人自己的事，任何外部势力的干涉会有害于这个目标而不是有利"<--------何來文中有這一點?
其中第8點和第9點是:
Eighth, US strategy must never forget the innately realist nature of the Chinese strategy that it is seeking to defeat.
Ninth, US strategy must understand that China remains for the time being highly anxious about military conflict with the United States, but that this attitude will change as the military balance shifts over the next decade.
就是無論支持中國民主化與否,中國共產黨及中國人會主動找美國麻煩,並以擊敗美國為終極目標!
就是簡單一句,中國共產黨會送上門送死
這不叫大道理,這叫基礎英文能力!
煩請少看一些中文來源文章!
另外
"再次强调，共产党及其家属加起来有几亿人"..............公职人员”下台<-----OK!已經有文章說過中國人自身民主基本就是蘇聯-俄羅斯路線,你準備PUTIN中國低配版吧,你以為你是唯一一個想到這個問題?
你明顯英文能力有問題!
主要是以下三點
1.The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
2. US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
3.The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.
"所以他们早就不把让共党下台作为战略目标了。文中也说的很清楚，实现民主归根结底是中国人自己的事，任何外部势力的干涉会有害于这个目标而不是有利"<--------何來文中有這一點?
其中第8點和第9點是:
Eighth, US strategy must never forget the innately realist nature of the Chinese strategy that it is seeking to defeat.
Ninth, US strategy must understand that China remains for the time being highly anxious about military conflict with the United States, but that this attitude will change as the military balance shifts over the next decade.
就是無論支持中國民主化與否,中國共產黨及中國人會主動找美國麻煩,並以擊敗美國為終極目標!
就是簡單一句,中國共產黨會送上門送死
這不叫大道理,這叫基礎英文能力!
煩請少看一些中文來源文章!
另外
"再次强调，共产党及其家属加起来有几亿人"..............公职人员”下台<-----OK!已經有文章說過中國人自身民主基本就是蘇聯-俄羅斯路線,你準備PUTIN中國低配版吧,你以為你是唯一一個想到這個問題?
>>又出來表現中國式腦筋和閱讀理解能力!民主本来就是妥协的艺术<-----------這一句根本是中國人...
海外民运那帮人之所以失败，就是因为他们爱像你一样讲这些大道理，停留在空中不去研究中国的现实，幻想着美国能帮他们打下中国，却不想着怎么得到中国人的支持。
不管民主制度有再多美好的外衣，最终还是要得到大多数人的支持才能成功。而你总想着这些大道理，却不想着怎么得到大多数人的认可，似乎认为只要有这些理论，大多数人都会支持你
你幻想外部势力干涉，不就是像法轮功那帮人一样期待天灭共产党吗？期待一个绝对正义的力量把坏人劈死，建造一个理想中的国度。即使中国实现了民主，不还是要搞妥协的艺术？川普的胜利也证明了大多数人根本听不懂你这些大道理
可惜美国并不打算天灭共产党，这篇文章说得很清楚，任何外部势力的干涉只会让共产党更容易用民族主义团结中国人。所以美国不打算帮中国人实现民主，这终究是中国人自己的事
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/the-longer-telegram/
>>美国根本就不打算推翻中共，你不过是在幻想，有任何证据证明美国打算这么做吗？真要说利益勾兑，美国和中共...
"美国根本就不打算推翻中共，你不过是在幻想，有任何证据证明美国打算这么做吗？"
的確美國不會主動推翻中共,問題中共自己找上門呢?
問題是:這一篇文章是2021年2 月21日
現在最新是Center for Strategic and International Studies的Toward a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis?
特別俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後,看法已經完成不同!
>>海外民运那帮人之所以失败，就是因为他们爱像你一样讲这些大道理，停留在空中不去研究中国的现实，幻想着美...
又玩COPY AND PASTE！
大多数人的支持才能成功？大多數中國支持中國共產黨，所以為什麼需要他們支持？
大道理？說不過就開始東拉西扯，開始說他人不切實際，其實是自己無料到！
你幻想外部势力干涉？我那一隻字說外部勢力？我只說指望中國人或中國共產黨某類推行民主社會基本可能性很低，結果一定是自己找死，外部勢力收拾結果！
>>那一篇叫The Longer Telegram： Toward A New American Chi...
笑死人了，我把整篇文章都看完了，你看了个摘要就说文中没有这一点？
而且即使你这个摘要也明白写明了，美国的核心战略是让共产党意识到和美国合作更好，让中国共产党和习近平切割，回到之前的道路。
你能看完文章再来说吗？文章反复表达了类似的观点，美国要让习近平下台，回到江胡的道路，而不是推翻共产党。
There is no reason to believe it impossible, if such a strategy is successfully followed, that Xi will in time be replaced by the more traditional form of Communist Party leadership. Xi, as noted previously, is already provoking significant reactions against himself and his current strategic course. Over the longer term the Chinese people themselves may well come to question and challenge the party’s century-long proposition that China’s ancient civilization is forever destined to an authoritarian future. The latter, however, is ultimately a matter for the Chinese people themselves, rather than US strategy. Instead, the ambition of US strategy for the decades ahead should be to cause China’s Communist Party leadership to change strategic course—with or without Xi at the helm.
>>海外民运那帮人之所以失败，就是因为他们爱像你一样讲这些大道理，停留在空中不去研究中国的现实，幻想着美...
中国的现实＜現實就是中國大部分人根本不想要，甚至認為民主社會多餘和垃圾，甚至對他們有害！
的確中國人自己的事，中國人都不要，沒有人會犯賤推銷中國人民主，反正中國人的確需要大皇帝
否則如何解釋一尊可以如此橫行無忌?大家搞得死去活來仍然沒有辦法！
法轮功那帮人一样期待天灭共产党吗？＜——又玩扣帽子！說不過人就煩請謙虛學習，求其一個連結就當交功課，中國人果然水平驚人！
難怪中國沒有民主的可能，你就是活見證例子！
>>又出來表現中國式腦筋和閱讀理解能力!民主本来就是妥协的艺术<-----------這一句根本是中國人...
再摘录一段，美国人务实得很：
Others may argue that none of the United States’ strategic challenges arising from China can be dealt with effectively unless the party itself disappears altogether and is replaced by a pluralist democracy. The problem with this critique is that it assumes that inducing a Communist Party collapse is somehow achievable in the foreseeable future. As noted previously, the party may collapse over time because of the profound internal contradictions that exist between its current political and economic missions; but, as with the Soviet Union, that will be brought about by the internal dynamics of the Chinese system itself. External pressure may either help or hinder this process of long-term internal change, but any explicit campaign to overthrow the Communist Party is more likely to impede that objective than accelerate it. A campaign to overthrow the party also ignores the fact that China under all five of its post-Mao leaders prior to Xi was able to work productively with the United States, irrespective of what long-term ambitions these leaders may have had for their country. Finally, the party-overthrow argument asks us to suspend judgment as to what sort of future China might have in the event of a complete implosion of the current political system. Putin’s postcommunist form of Russian übernationalism offers a salutary lesson in this regard. For these reasons, all US political and policy responses to China’s current strategy should be focused through the single lens of Xi himself.
>>笑死人了，我把整篇文章都看完了，你看了个摘要就说文中没有这一点？而且即使你这个摘要也明白写明了，美国...
又出來搞笑
China will reject all forms of international human rights pressure concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, as well as other forms of domestic political and religious dissent within China proper, as the regime doubles down through its repressive control systems in defense of the Leninist state. The party believes the West’s interest in human rights is driven by episodic political fads, which have been successfully undermined in the past by economic inducements and diplomatic pressure. Because China is now much stronger in its ability to withstand any sustained external sanctions, it now cares much less than before.
Beijing will accelerate its military preparedness for Taiwan Strait scenarios, with a view to achieving absolute military supremacy over Taiwan and the United States out to the second island chain by decade’s end. The objective would be to cause the United States to choose not to go to war in support of Taiwan out of fear that it may well lose. This would then leave Taiwan with little option other than to comply politically with Beijing’s reunification formula.
China also will continue to strengthen its military capabilities including expanding its conventional forces and modernizing, expanding, and hardening its strategic nuclear force. In part this push is driven by US advances in ballistic missile defense technology and the increased deployment of US anti-ballistic missile platforms in East Asia to counter North Korean contingencies.
Its power projection into the Indian Ocean region will accelerate, supported by a growing range of dual-use port and air facilities across South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East. Strategic competition between China and the United States over the Gulf States will become more acute given relative US energy self-sufficiency and China’s replacement of the United States as the Gulf’s largest energy market.
Beijing will accelerate its push for greater economic self-reliance that is designed, as noted previously, to reduce the dependence of China’s economic growth on exports, as well as to achieve complete technological independence from the West and, additionally, to use these new Chinese technology products, services, and platforms to supplant the United States in setting global industry standards. Moreover, Beijing will strive to liberalize China’s exchange rate and capital account before the end of the decade, by which time Chinese financial markets will be large enough to offset the risks of foreign economic pressure on China’s domestic political autonomy.
China will renew its collaboration with the United States on mitigating climate change, which is a higher-profile topic in Washington following the inauguration of President Joe Biden. China’s recognition of the need for action on this front is grounded in its domestic concerns over air pollution, water scarcity, and extreme weather events. China also sees renewed climate change activism as critical for its future international reputation, particularly in Europe. More importantly, it sees this as one possible platform for restabilizing the US-China relationship, given the high priority the Democratic Party now attaches to climate change.
The next step in the BRI is for consolidation as a geopolitical and geoeconomic bloc in support of China’s ambitions, making the initiative the foundation for a future Sinocentric global order. However, given the scale of China’s competing financial demands from its military, aging population, and the fiscal impact of the 2020 pandemic and recession, the scope of the BRI may be scaled back somewhat from its original, gargantuan ambitions.
Beijing is likely to double down on its economic and diplomatic offensive across Southeast Asia to consolidate the gains already made in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Myanmar, while making Indonesia the central focus for the decade ahead.
China will aim to draw Seoul into China’s economic and strategic sphere of influence, including by causing South Korea to conclude that Beijing is its best bet to manage any future threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Beijing will seek to preempt any possible US initiative to separate Moscow from Beijing, including any attempt to deescalate tensions or even to normalize relations with Russia in order to place new strategic pressure on China.
Europe will become a decisive battleground for US-China strategic competition, with Beijing seeing EU member states as alternative markets for Chinese goods, alternative sources of capital and technology, and a less strident condemner of Chinese human rights abuses and security provocations in Asia.
Chinese strategy toward Japan and India will be uncertain, with past strategies to deescalate tensions with Tokyo and New Delhi having stalled as traditional border tensions have resumed their previous role in dominating both of these relationships.
China will accelerate its successful efforts to date in cultivating Africa and Latin America as zones of economic and foreign-policy influence. China sees both as major emerging markets, as well as major sources of votes to support China’s ambitions in multilateral and international institutions.
China will seek to sway more states to jump on its bandwagon, rather than continue to work with the United States to “balance” against China, by leveraging the real or perceived eclipse of US power to do so. Overall, China sees all of the above regions in increasingly binary terms as arenas of competition for influence with the United States, and will by decade’s end seek to shift the political and foreign-policy balance significantly in China’s favor.
China will become more activist in advancing global diplomatic initiatives within the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, including well beyond its own region, in order to demonstrate its credentials for global leadership.
China will use its growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s values and interests, particularly on human rights and maritime law. China also will seek to use the normative processes of these institutions to legitimize Chinese concepts and large-scale initiatives including the BRI.
Ultimately, China will seek to advance a new, hierarchical conception of international order and development under Xi’s deliberately amorphous concept of a “community of common destiny for all mankind.”
結論非常簡單:中國會主動美國麻煩,至於中國民主與否,根本沒有關係
似乎"我把整篇文章都看完了"<-----和事實相違
>>再摘录一段，美国人务实得很：Others may argue that none of the Un...
而最好笑是這一篇文章是2021年2 月21日
現在是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後
Kroenig in The National Desk on challenges posed by continued Sino-Russian alignment
Culver on Sinica Podcast: Another Taiwan Straits Crisis?
Coalitions of the weak: Elite politics in China from Mao's stratagem to the rise of Xi
為什麼不看最新的討論?只針對一篇過時文章?分明就是選擇性引用!
>>再摘录一段，美国人务实得很：Others may argue that none of the Un...
對啦
這篇文章提到Sixth, the United States must rebalance its relationship with Russia whether it likes it or not.
按照你的定義,現在美國國國政策支持烏克蘭,是否違反這篇文章?
到底是本身這一類智庫文重要,還是事情局勢發展本身就不受這一堆知庫文章所限制?
煩請別一篇文章當天書,中國人腦筋!
