如何平价 解放军高级军官Zhou Bo在纽约时报观点区发布烂文 中美完全可以共存？
链接：https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/opinion/pla-us-china-cold-war-military-sea.html
China and America Can Compete and Coexist
标题发错了，是中美可以竞争并共存
By Zhou Bo
Mr. Zhou is a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army.
BEIJING — Forget the trade war. If the gravest challenge of the 21st century is finding ways that China and the United States can coexist competitively, the real danger is that an unexpected incident might trigger a conflict that neither side has anticipated or could possibly control. The likeliest potential flash point is the South China Sea.
China believes, and has said as much in a 2014 position paper, that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea islands and the adjacent waters. This claim is solidly grounded in history and law, the government argues, because “China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the South China Sea islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them.”
Some coastal states in the region disagree — most notably perhaps the Philippines, but also Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and more recently, Indonesia. They defend other, sometimes competing, territorial claims, based on their own accounts of history and geography.
The United States, for its part, has historically vowed not to take sides in these disputes over sovereignty, arguing that it only wants to protect free navigation in the region’s waters.
But China has denounced America’s professed commitment to neutrality as hypocritical in several ways. And as academics like M. Taylor Fravel have argued, there seems to be something of an inherent contradiction in the United States’ policy: between its claim to want to stay out of local disputes and the resurgence of its operations in the region, particularly since it identified one country — China — as “the primary source of increased tensions” there.
What’s more, whenever an American vessel sails close to islands or rocks controlled by China, in waters patrolled by Chinese ships, the risk of a dangerous encounter rises.
In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a United States Navy surveillance plane, killing the Chinese pilot. A tense diplomatic standoff over the detained American pilot and crew was resolved after Washington said, twice, that it was “very sorry” — without officially accepting responsibility for the accident and death. Since then, there have been quite a few close encounters between American and Chinese military vessels and aircraft, again in 2001, and then in 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2018.
Under the Trump administration, the United States Navy has increased its freedom-of-navigation operations, including in waters that China claims as its own, and those maneuvers increase the risk of an incident. The American destroyer Decatur and the Chinese destroyer Lanzhou narrowly avoided a collision, by just 45 yards, in September 2018 — the hairiest encounter in years.
Should another collision occur today, it won’t be resolved as easily as the one in 2001 was. An ever-rising China can only be more determined to safeguard what it sees as its sovereign rights, especially when Washington has deliberately intensified its competition with Beijing, and rather aggressively. Thucydides identified three motivations — fear, honor and interest — as the main causes of a war, and the South China Sea features them all.
They Wanted a Multigenerational Home in Brooklyn. Which Apartment Did They Choose?
[url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/29/realestate/30hunt-limongello.html?algo=bandit-story&fellback=false&imp_id=950816435&imp_id=9298820][/url]
Partly because China has ramped up its military arsenal and fleet in recent years, as well as built up outposts in the South China Sea, the Trump administration has called it a “strategic competitor,” including in the 2017 National Security Strategy paper and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Washington has also said that Beijing is a “revisionist power.”
China, in turn, released a defense white paper last summer that described the United States as having “adopted unilateral policies” and “provoked and intensified competition among major countries.”
With the temperature seeming to rise on both sides, how can a conflict, or something like a new cold war, between China and the United States be avoided? Precisely by looking at the actual Cold War.
In the early years of that protracted standoff, American and Soviet aircrafts didn’t hesitate to fire at one another. There were three crises over the status of divided Berlin, in 1948, 1958 and 1961. The Cuban missile crisis brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. And yet outright conflict was averted, thanks to a few modest agreements and well-established hotlines for emergency communication. Even bitter enemies can build trust, and with imperfect tools, when they measure the stakes of a full-on clash.
In 1972, Washington and Moscow signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas — vowing, among other things, to use clear communication signals, avoid “embarrassing or endangering” even ships under their surveillance and exercise “the greatest caution and prudence in approaching” vessels on the high seas. The accord didn’t prevent two Soviet ships from bumping into two American ships in Soviet territorial waters in February 1988, but that was an outlier incident, and the agreement does seem to have drastically reduced the overall risk of dangerous encounters. Within two years of its entry into force, according to a 2012 paper by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, then a law professor at the United States Naval War College, the number of incidents per year had dropped from 100 to 40.
If the Soviet Union and the United States managed to avoid a major conflict during the Cold War, then some degree of confidence seems in order today about the far less confrontational relations between China and the United States.
Unlike the military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was global, any military competition between the United States and China is confined to the western Pacific. America thinks that China wants to drive it out of the region; China believes America wants to block its legitimate ambition to develop a blue-water navy and hopes instead to confine China’s influence to the eastern coast of continental Asia.
Yet even though China has built up its military capacity at an awesome speed, it has shown no appetite to replace the United States as world policeman. China’s operations far from its shores, such as in the Gulf of Aden or on the African continent, are limited to addressing threats such as piracy or participating in peacekeeping and disaster relief. The United States Navy, on the other hand, regularly sends ships to the Asia-Pacific region in a deliberate effort to “challenge” — its own term — the “excessive maritime claims” of some coastal states.
Still, even the wariest of observers have yet to describe China and the United States as actual enemies. At the last Xiangshan Forum in October — the Chinese government’s version of the Shangri-La Dialogue — Wei Fenghe, the defense minister, said, “The China-United States military relationship is generally stable, but we are confronted with many difficulties and challenges.”
The confidence-building measures that exist today between China and the United States are rudimentary compared to those between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. In a way, this may be a comforting fact: a suggestion that relations haven’t become so hostile as to require many such measures. Yet more of them will be necessary in the long run.
In 1998, China and the United States, acting in “the spirit of mutual respect,” signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to “establish a stable channel for consultations between their respective maritime and air forces.” In 2014 came the nonbinding Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.
Chinese and American aircraft nonetheless collided after the 1998 agreement, and there have been dangerously close calls even since the two later sets of guidelines. In other words, confidence-building measures alone can neither prevent incidents nor overcome strategic distrust — today no more than in the past. And yet they remain essential to preventing any mishap from escalating and to developing working relations between China and America despite their divergent interests.
As China’s military strength continues to grow and it closes the gap with the United States, both sides will almost certainly need to put more rules in place, not only in areas like antipiracy or disaster relief — where the two countries already have been cooperating — but also regarding space exploration, cyberspace and artificial intelligence.
For Chinese people, who traditionally believe in yin and yang, the notion that rivals can cooperate isn’t a contradiction in terms. It seems to be a problem for America, however. Officials in Washington and other Western capitals have expressed dismay that China hasn’t become more like the United States, or at least more democratic. But did China ever pledge to become like the United States? And so what if it hasn’t become that? Competitive coexistence is still possible.
China and America Can Compete and Coexist
标题发错了，是中美可以竞争并共存
Even strategic enemies can build trust when they measure the stakes of a full-on clash.
By Zhou Bo
Mr. Zhou is a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army.
BEIJING — Forget the trade war. If the gravest challenge of the 21st century is finding ways that China and the United States can coexist competitively, the real danger is that an unexpected incident might trigger a conflict that neither side has anticipated or could possibly control. The likeliest potential flash point is the South China Sea.
China believes, and has said as much in a 2014 position paper, that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea islands and the adjacent waters. This claim is solidly grounded in history and law, the government argues, because “China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the South China Sea islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them.”
Some coastal states in the region disagree — most notably perhaps the Philippines, but also Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and more recently, Indonesia. They defend other, sometimes competing, territorial claims, based on their own accounts of history and geography.
The United States, for its part, has historically vowed not to take sides in these disputes over sovereignty, arguing that it only wants to protect free navigation in the region’s waters.
But China has denounced America’s professed commitment to neutrality as hypocritical in several ways. And as academics like M. Taylor Fravel have argued, there seems to be something of an inherent contradiction in the United States’ policy: between its claim to want to stay out of local disputes and the resurgence of its operations in the region, particularly since it identified one country — China — as “the primary source of increased tensions” there.
What’s more, whenever an American vessel sails close to islands or rocks controlled by China, in waters patrolled by Chinese ships, the risk of a dangerous encounter rises.
In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a United States Navy surveillance plane, killing the Chinese pilot. A tense diplomatic standoff over the detained American pilot and crew was resolved after Washington said, twice, that it was “very sorry” — without officially accepting responsibility for the accident and death. Since then, there have been quite a few close encounters between American and Chinese military vessels and aircraft, again in 2001, and then in 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2018.
Under the Trump administration, the United States Navy has increased its freedom-of-navigation operations, including in waters that China claims as its own, and those maneuvers increase the risk of an incident. The American destroyer Decatur and the Chinese destroyer Lanzhou narrowly avoided a collision, by just 45 yards, in September 2018 — the hairiest encounter in years.
Should another collision occur today, it won’t be resolved as easily as the one in 2001 was. An ever-rising China can only be more determined to safeguard what it sees as its sovereign rights, especially when Washington has deliberately intensified its competition with Beijing, and rather aggressively. Thucydides identified three motivations — fear, honor and interest — as the main causes of a war, and the South China Sea features them all.
They Wanted a Multigenerational Home in Brooklyn. Which Apartment Did They Choose?
[url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/29/realestate/30hunt-limongello.html?algo=bandit-story&fellback=false&imp_id=950816435&imp_id=9298820][/url]
Partly because China has ramped up its military arsenal and fleet in recent years, as well as built up outposts in the South China Sea, the Trump administration has called it a “strategic competitor,” including in the 2017 National Security Strategy paper and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Washington has also said that Beijing is a “revisionist power.”
China, in turn, released a defense white paper last summer that described the United States as having “adopted unilateral policies” and “provoked and intensified competition among major countries.”
With the temperature seeming to rise on both sides, how can a conflict, or something like a new cold war, between China and the United States be avoided? Precisely by looking at the actual Cold War.
In the early years of that protracted standoff, American and Soviet aircrafts didn’t hesitate to fire at one another. There were three crises over the status of divided Berlin, in 1948, 1958 and 1961. The Cuban missile crisis brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. And yet outright conflict was averted, thanks to a few modest agreements and well-established hotlines for emergency communication. Even bitter enemies can build trust, and with imperfect tools, when they measure the stakes of a full-on clash.
In 1972, Washington and Moscow signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas — vowing, among other things, to use clear communication signals, avoid “embarrassing or endangering” even ships under their surveillance and exercise “the greatest caution and prudence in approaching” vessels on the high seas. The accord didn’t prevent two Soviet ships from bumping into two American ships in Soviet territorial waters in February 1988, but that was an outlier incident, and the agreement does seem to have drastically reduced the overall risk of dangerous encounters. Within two years of its entry into force, according to a 2012 paper by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, then a law professor at the United States Naval War College, the number of incidents per year had dropped from 100 to 40.
If the Soviet Union and the United States managed to avoid a major conflict during the Cold War, then some degree of confidence seems in order today about the far less confrontational relations between China and the United States.
Unlike the military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was global, any military competition between the United States and China is confined to the western Pacific. America thinks that China wants to drive it out of the region; China believes America wants to block its legitimate ambition to develop a blue-water navy and hopes instead to confine China’s influence to the eastern coast of continental Asia.
Yet even though China has built up its military capacity at an awesome speed, it has shown no appetite to replace the United States as world policeman. China’s operations far from its shores, such as in the Gulf of Aden or on the African continent, are limited to addressing threats such as piracy or participating in peacekeeping and disaster relief. The United States Navy, on the other hand, regularly sends ships to the Asia-Pacific region in a deliberate effort to “challenge” — its own term — the “excessive maritime claims” of some coastal states.
Still, even the wariest of observers have yet to describe China and the United States as actual enemies. At the last Xiangshan Forum in October — the Chinese government’s version of the Shangri-La Dialogue — Wei Fenghe, the defense minister, said, “The China-United States military relationship is generally stable, but we are confronted with many difficulties and challenges.”
The confidence-building measures that exist today between China and the United States are rudimentary compared to those between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. In a way, this may be a comforting fact: a suggestion that relations haven’t become so hostile as to require many such measures. Yet more of them will be necessary in the long run.
In 1998, China and the United States, acting in “the spirit of mutual respect,” signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to “establish a stable channel for consultations between their respective maritime and air forces.” In 2014 came the nonbinding Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.
Chinese and American aircraft nonetheless collided after the 1998 agreement, and there have been dangerously close calls even since the two later sets of guidelines. In other words, confidence-building measures alone can neither prevent incidents nor overcome strategic distrust — today no more than in the past. And yet they remain essential to preventing any mishap from escalating and to developing working relations between China and America despite their divergent interests.
As China’s military strength continues to grow and it closes the gap with the United States, both sides will almost certainly need to put more rules in place, not only in areas like antipiracy or disaster relief — where the two countries already have been cooperating — but also regarding space exploration, cyberspace and artificial intelligence.
For Chinese people, who traditionally believe in yin and yang, the notion that rivals can cooperate isn’t a contradiction in terms. It seems to be a problem for America, however. Officials in Washington and other Western capitals have expressed dismay that China hasn’t become more like the United States, or at least more democratic. But did China ever pledge to become like the United States? And so what if it hasn’t become that? Competitive coexistence is still possible.
无他，牛屎爱钱尔。
紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁
紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁紫薯补丁
周可以繼續做他的強國夢 但繼續這樣蠻幹美國當然當你是敵人. 這不就是陰陽?
https://www.scmp.com/author/zhou-bo
https://www.scmp.com/author/zhou-bo
操着英国口音的他做为解放军外事部主任是我们策反的好对象
就是说这个共匪上校在乞求美国允许共匪在西太平洋恣意发挥？还胡扯什麽阴阳和谐？这孙子以为他是谁？美国还能再像以前那样对共匪的扩张不发声？不动作？
笑话，希特勒更慷慨，可以与英美苏共存前提是整个欧洲都归纳粹，可能吗？
内斗升级ing...这是公然抽一尊的脸啊
加速加速加速加速加速
加速加速加速加速加速
当然可以共存啊，美国需要一个只做低端制造业的中国
因为独裁国家非常害怕被抛弃，他们明白自己的国家很脆弱，所以求着美国绕他一条狗命
中美当然可以共存，中共国当然奈何不了美国，可他妈的如果让中共国继续存在下去，中国人和美国之外的其他小国家可要倒了血霉了。
纽约时报被黄金蓝到了这个地步啊，不可想象，不可想象啊。
其實今天不想共存的是中共，還是那句話：中共說的話要反著解讀.
美國是希望與中國共存的啊，如果不希望幹嘛扶持中國？幹嘛允許中共的悶聲大發財？
是中共不滿足於現況，有了錢還想要更多，有了權還想要更大的，要控制週邊國家 要制定中共滿意的遊戲規則 要符合中共的利益，他們只不過是想把在中國內部玩的那一套輸出到國際上而已，偷技術滲透別國內政用權錢交易收買人心破壞人家原本運作正常的系統，想要用自己的那套價值觀改變別國的規則，壓榨別國的人民.
他們自己不把非趙家的人當人看，就是一群反人類的敗類，自以為穿上高級訂製服戴上名錶開了豪車就是人上人了，外表裝沒有用的內心還是一個自以為是的山土匪泥腿子而已.
美國是希望與中國共存的啊，如果不希望幹嘛扶持中國？幹嘛允許中共的悶聲大發財？
是中共不滿足於現況，有了錢還想要更多，有了權還想要更大的，要控制週邊國家 要制定中共滿意的遊戲規則 要符合中共的利益，他們只不過是想把在中國內部玩的那一套輸出到國際上而已，偷技術滲透別國內政用權錢交易收買人心破壞人家原本運作正常的系統，想要用自己的那套價值觀改變別國的規則，壓榨別國的人民.
他們自己不把非趙家的人當人看，就是一群反人類的敗類，自以為穿上高級訂製服戴上名錶開了豪車就是人上人了，外表裝沒有用的內心還是一個自以為是的山土匪泥腿子而已.
这个观点从前就有，就是太平洋可以共存两个国家，大概是这样的表达吧。不过现在说这个，有用吗？
Not even a single sentence can be taken as fact.
Besides deception and bluff, there is nothing more the PLA can do.
I assume NYT is really facing a predictable financial crysis which only hightens its need for External fund, and the need is urgent.
Besides deception and bluff, there is nothing more the PLA can do.
I assume NYT is really facing a predictable financial crysis which only hightens its need for External fund, and the need is urgent.
从来没有人说不能共存吧，怎么国内的人都觉得是美国先搞事？
我想無法共存的是共黨跟韭菜。
趙家跟美國聯手獲利二十幾年，共存的很好吧。
如果今天領導集團是低調安撫美國策略，估計這韭菜還能割得沒完沒了。
幸好習包野心頗大，打算打破這聯手獲利變成趙家獨吞。美國才意識到與趙家攜手時吃虧不少。
這年頭只缺一件能引起韭菜覺醒的事。目前看來，coronavirus有能成為這件事的可能性。
趙家跟美國聯手獲利二十幾年，共存的很好吧。
如果今天領導集團是低調安撫美國策略，估計這韭菜還能割得沒完沒了。
幸好習包野心頗大，打算打破這聯手獲利變成趙家獨吞。美國才意識到與趙家攜手時吃虧不少。
這年頭只缺一件能引起韭菜覺醒的事。目前看來，coronavirus有能成為這件事的可能性。
要美国接受它那些价值观，一起压迫地球其他人类，因为中共真的很怕很怕美国，可以说是一种最邪恶的投降书
这个周波不认识,刚搜了下他以前发布的2019的凤凰采访,周波大校：中美在航行自由上应该合作而不是对抗,这个人明显是亲美保海上贸易经济的,这个风格显然不对包帝胃口.
Zhou Bo？
笔名事周永康加薄熙来的意思吗？太反动了，用反党集团的名字去跟敌人媾和，建议枪毙。
上边是说笑的。不过大家仔细想想，一个大外宣雇佣的背景混沌不明的枪手，写了篇维稳枪文放在大外宣最爱的付费新闻平台，有何可读性？随着越来越多的自由世界政界人物渐渐清醒，这样的维稳枪文，只能越来越没有市场；而提供枪文发表平台的无德媒体，也只能在一次又一次的言论信誉破产之后，走向衰败的命运。
ps:美国这类报纸，似乎在付费新闻边上会有一行小字，写着大意是this is a paid passage by ……（机构名），如果没有这行字，是可以以虚假新闻罪起诉报纸的。还望有纽时纸质版的人能拿起当天的报纸，看看这篇文边上有没有付费的标记。
笔名事周永康加薄熙来的意思吗？太反动了，用反党集团的名字去跟敌人媾和，建议枪毙。
上边是说笑的。不过大家仔细想想，一个大外宣雇佣的背景混沌不明的枪手，写了篇维稳枪文放在大外宣最爱的付费新闻平台，有何可读性？随着越来越多的自由世界政界人物渐渐清醒，这样的维稳枪文，只能越来越没有市场；而提供枪文发表平台的无德媒体，也只能在一次又一次的言论信誉破产之后，走向衰败的命运。
ps:美国这类报纸，似乎在付费新闻边上会有一行小字，写着大意是this is a paid passage by ……（机构名），如果没有这行字，是可以以虚假新闻罪起诉报纸的。还望有纽时纸质版的人能拿起当天的报纸，看看这篇文边上有没有付费的标记。
当年它们也是这么和国民党说的。
历史惊人的相似性，当年共产党盗墓种鸦片，现在抄袭，盗窃。
历史惊人的相似性，当年共产党盗墓种鸦片，现在抄袭，盗窃。
欧洲地区的冷战随着柏林墙的倒塌和克里姆林宫上的红旗坠地而终结了，但对美国人来说，天安门广场上的枪声以及三八线和台海之间的军事对峙可是时时刻刻的提醒着他们东亚地区的所谓正邪之争依然胜负未分，搞清楚这一点也就明白为何现在的美国人要摆出这么一副架势出来了。就算是面对苏联，里根政府都有决心要将苏联取得的一系列政治进展推回历史的原点，更何况面对今天的党国呢。Zhou Bo 没弄明白的是，冷战其实就从来没结束过，无论中美两国之间有多少利益的交叉重合，但归根结底是走不到一块儿的。这对美国人来说就是你死我活的斗争，是所谓正义与邪恶的较量，根本不存在缓和的余地。至于为什么，原文最后也提到了。“China hasn’t become more like the United States, or at least more democratic“.
蓝色药丸2
黑名单
大家把他发到墙内，让粉红好好批判一下投降主义