Reddit搬运：美智库对于台海战争的分析
台海战争结果如何？——简单解读美国智库报告
最近又有人炒作假新闻，什么”要求中共子女亲属春节前回国“，这不一眼搞笑呢？那帮人加起来得有几万人，正一手开着法拉利炸街，一手搂着烂裤裆只女享受快乐人生了，回国就没考虑过。
图我就不发了，这里引用别人的辟谣
>至少兩個明顯瑕疵：
標題不符合一貫公文習慣。
通知一般標題是「關於⋯⋯⋯的通知」。 中央軍委的全稱是「中國共產黨中央軍事委員會」，公章顯然是假的。
不过借这个机会可以简单提提台海战争
23年美国智库发了个报告，”The First Battle of the Next War——Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan“，就是讲台海战争的结果
我猜有小学文化的会问了：美国智库是啥？
>About CSIS
>关于战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）
>The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world's greatest challenges.
>战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）是一个两党制的非营利政策研究机构，致力于推进解决世界重大挑战的实用理念。
>We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development.
>我们以明确的价值观为指导——无党派立场、独立思考、创新思维、跨学科研究、诚信与专业精神，以及人才培养。
这个机构在美国历史上起到了非常大的作用，包括预测中国将参加朝鲜战争、商讨美国在阿富汗和伊拉克的撤军方案等等，非常具有参考价值
这个报告的全文特别长，165页，我就不挨个引用了，直接摘几段重点，有哪段不想看可以跳过
（有哪不同意找美国人去，我这全是引用他们的，你骂我只能证明你的文化水平和小学博士一样）
**台海战争的结果是什么？**
>In the most likely "base scenario," the Chinese invasion quickly founders.
>在最可能发生的"基本情景"中，中国的入侵很快就陷入困境。
>China's strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.
>中国对日本基地和美国水面舰艇的打击无法改变结果：台湾保持自治。
**而且还给你总结了一遍全过程**
>The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan's navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
>入侵总是以相同的方式开始：战争爆发后的最初几小时内，一轮猛烈的轰炸摧毁了台湾大部分的海军和空军。
>Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island.
>在强大火箭部队的增援下，中国海军包围了台湾，并阻止任何试图向被围困岛屿输送船只和飞机的行为。
>Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.
>数万名中国士兵乘坐军用两栖作战船只和民用滚装船渡过海峡，同时空中突击部队和空降部队在滩头后方登陆。
>However, in the most likely "base scenario," the Chinese invasion quickly founders.
>然而，在最可能发生的"基本情景"中，中国的入侵很快就陷入困境。
>Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland.
>尽管中国进行了大规模轰炸，台湾地面部队仍源源不断地涌向登陆地点，入侵者在那里艰难地补给和向内陆推进。
>Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet.
>与此同时，美国潜艇、轰炸机和战斗/攻击机，在日本自卫队的增援下，迅速重创了中国的两栖作战舰队。
**但是这只是可能性最大的一个，报告里一共进行了24次模拟，包括最乐观的和最悲观的**
**最乐观结果**
>Chinese Defeat: The Chinese amphibious fleet is mostly destroyed, and the Chinese have not taken sufficient ports or airports such that major landing operations can continue.
>中国失败：中国两栖舰队大部分被摧毁，且中国未能占领足够的港口或机场以继续进行大规模登陆作战。
>Relatively small Chinese forces are confined to a small landing area, and they are only receiving small amounts of supplies from airdrops and small civilian boats.
>相对较小的中国部队被限制在狭小的登陆区域内，他们只能通过空投和小型民用船只获得少量补给。
>At this point, it would be a matter of time for the Taiwanese forces to mop up Chinese survivors. The main challenge for the United States would not be in eliminating the remaining invaders but finding an acceptable off-ramp for hostilities.
>在这种情况下，台湾部队清剿中国残余部队只是时间问题。美国面临的主要挑战不是消灭剩余入侵者，而是找到一个可接受的结束敌对状态的方式。
**最悲观结果**
>Chinese Victory: Chinese ground forces outnumber Taiwanese forces on the island.
>中国胜利：中国地面部队在岛上的数量超过台湾部队。
>Once that happens, and the Chinese control enough airports and ports to bring the bulk of their ground forces over, they will eventually prevail, though the complete conquest of an island the size of Taiwan would take many months, barring a capitulation.
>一旦出现这种情况，且中国控制了足够的机场和港口以输送其主力地面部队，他们最终将获胜，尽管完全征服台湾这样规模的岛屿需要数月时间，除非对方投降。
>Two iterations continued until total conquest; most iterations were ended when Chinese victory appeared inevitable.
>两次模拟持续到完全征服阶段；大多数模拟在中国胜利已成定局时便告终止。
**不过也有可能出现僵持**
>Stalemate: Chinese forces have a significant lodgment ashore, and neither side can make rapid gains.
>僵持局面：中国军队在岸上建立了重要据点，双方都无法快速取得进展。
>Chinese forces have captured a handful of ports and airports. The United States is striking those facilities to make or keep them fully unusable, while China is attempting to repair them and make them fully functional.
>中国军队占领了数个港口和机场。美国持续打击这些设施使其完全无法使用，而中国则试图修复并使其恢复完全功能。
>This outcome typically occurred when China was able to secure the southern part of the island and the facilities there.
>这种结果通常出现在中国成功控制该岛南部及其设施时。
>a. Stalemate, trending toward China: China has a solid beachhead that is not in danger of being eliminated.
>a. 僵持但趋向中国优势：中国建立了稳固的滩头阵地，不存在被消灭的危险。
>They have more than three ports or airports on Taiwan, although these may be damaged.
>他们在台湾控制了超过三个港口或机场，尽管这些设施可能受损。
>To defeat the invasion, the United States and its allies would have to keep these ports and airports suppressed, resupply Taiwan, and, possibly, commit ground forces to rescue the Taiwanese position.
>要击退入侵，美国及其盟友必须持续压制这些港口和机场，为台湾提供补给，并可能需要投入地面部队来挽救台湾的战局。
>China would have to clear ports or airports with the engineers landed, possibly while under attack.
>中国则需要利用已登陆的工程部队清理港口或机场，这一过程可能在遭受攻击的情况下进行。
>b. Stalemate, indeterminate: An ambiguous situation, often involving the loss of the entire Chinese amphibious fleet, but with Chinese forces securely ashore and having occupied several damaged port or airport facilities.
>b. 僵持且局势不明：一种模糊的情况，通常涉及整个中国两栖舰队的损失，但中国军队已安全登陆并占领了几个受损的港口或机场设施。
>Resolution depends on whether China can restore the captured facilities to supply and expand its forces before Taiwanese forces counterattack in strength. The campaign would take an extended period.
>局势的解决取决于中国能否在台湾部队发动大规模反击之前恢复被占领设施以供应和扩充其部队。这场战役将持续较长时间。
>c. Stalemate, trending against China: Although the Chinese have a significant beachhead, they do not possess a favorable enough force ratio to make quick gains against opposing Taiwanese ground forces.
>c. 僵持但不利于中国：尽管中国建立了重要的滩头阵地，但他们没有足够有利的兵力比来快速突破台湾地面部队的防线。
>The Chinese amphibious fleet has suffered high attrition, and they have no working ports and airports on Taiwan.
>中国两栖舰队遭受了重大损失，他们在台湾没有可用的港口和机场。
>China is trying to substitute small civilian craft for the large amphibious carriers that it has lost, but as the British found at Gallipoli, this results in a dramatically lower supply throughput.
>中国正试图用小型民用船只替代已损失的大型两栖运输舰，但正如英国在加里波利战役中发现的那样，这会导致补给运输量大幅下降。
>An important question on the Taiwan side would include the state of its ammunition stocks and the ability to resupply. Whatever the eventual outcome, it is not where the Chinese would want to be.
>台湾方面的一个重要问题包括其弹药储备状况和补给能力。无论最终结果如何，这都不是中国希望看到的局面。
**报告里还提到了取得胜利的条件**
>The overall finding is that China is unlikely to succeed in an invasion of Taiwan in 2026 if four
>conditions hold.
>总体发现是，如果以下四个条件成立，中国在2026年不太可能成功对台湾发动进攻：
>Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.
>1. 台湾必须进行顽强抵抗。如果不这样做，其他一切都是徒劳的。
>The United States must join hostilities within days and with the full range of its capabilities.
>Delays and half measures make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, and raise the risk
>of the Chinese creating an irreducible lodgment on Taiwan.
>2. 美国必须在几天内加入战斗，并动用其全部能力。延迟和半途而废的措施会使防御更加困难，增加美国的伤亡，并提高中国在台湾建立不可消除的立足点的风险。
>The United States must have use of its bases in Japan. Without them, the United States cannot
>use its numerous fighter/attack aircraft.
>3. 美国必须能够使用其在日本的基地。没有这些基地，美国就无法使用其众多的战斗/攻击机。
>Finally, the United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.
>4. 最后，美国必须拥有足够的空射远程反舰巡航导弹。
**不过虽然取得胜利可能性很大，但也会付出惨痛的代价**
>However, even a successful defense of Taiwan comes at great cost.
>然而，即使成功保卫台湾也需要付出惨重的代价。
>The United States and its allies lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of personnel.
>美国及其盟友损失达到数十艘军舰、数百架飞机和数千名军事人员。
>The high losses would damage the United States' global position for many years.
>这些重大损失将损害美国在全球的战略地位多年。
>While Taiwan's military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a badly damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.
>虽然台湾军队尚未被击溃，但已严重受损，只能守卫一个失去电力和基本服务、经济遭受重创的岛屿。
>China's navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and thousands of soldiers are taken as prisoners or war.
>中国海军几近覆没，两栖部队的核心力量被摧毁，数千名士兵成为战俘。
**说了这么多，那现在对美军有啥建议呢？**
>Politics and Strategy
>政治与战略
>Clarify war plan assumptions
>明确战争规划的基本假设
>Avoid striking the Chinese mainland
>避免对中国大陆采取打击行动
>Prepare for heavy casualties
>为可能出现的重大伤亡做好准备
>Shift Taiwanese forces towards asymmetric capabilities
>推动台湾军事力量向非对称作战能力方向转型
>Doctrine and Posture
>军事理论与部署态势
>Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam
>强化并扩建在日本和关岛的空军基地
>Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine for aircraft survivability
>修订美国空军关于飞机生存能力的作战理论
>Avoid overflying Chinese mainland
>避免飞越中国大陆领空
>Recognize limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces
>认识到海军陆战队滨海团和陆军多域特遣队的能力局限
>Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities
>避免在危机时期进行可能造成战略弱点的部署
>Weapons and Platforms
>武器装备与作战平台
>Shift to smaller, more survivable ships
>转向发展更小型、生存能力更强的舰船
>Prioritize submarines and undersea platforms
>优先发展潜艇和水下作战平台
>Continue developing hypersonic weapons, but recognize their limitations
>继续发展高超音速武器，同时认识到其局限性
>Prioritize bomber fleet sustainment over fighters
>优先保障轰炸机机队而非战斗机的维持
>Produce more affordable fighters and balance stealth with non-stealth aircraft
>生产更具成本效益的战斗机，平衡隐身与非隐身飞机的比例
重点内容基本就在这了，你读到这基本就了解个差不多了
**全篇报告其实就一个主旨：别打**，中美台，加上提供军事基地的日，四方没一个获益的，正常人也就最多吓唬吓唬，脑子进水了才真动手
要是开打了，台湾是最惨的，直接成战场了，如果你是台湾人，看到这里可以打开谷歌，搜搜巴赫穆特，被狂轰滥炸完就是那个样子
在国内的如果你家方圆三公里没海空军的军事基地，那把心放肚子里，相信北约制导武器的精度；陆军的没事，报告里一直把打击重点放在海空军上，毕竟全国陆军现役就上百万谁能炸的完，直接把军舰炸沉让陆军渡不了海就完事了；但是随着制裁经济肯定崩溃，俄罗斯就是个例子，汽车制造业缩水80%，考虑到中国经济对外贸的依赖程度，到时候你就盼着能顿顿吃上馒头吧
美军的东亚战略部署基本报销，第七舰队可能不剩啥了，损失很大，肯定不希望开战；不过除了东亚还有很多其他的军事基地了，总体来看肯定比中国损失小
最倒霉的其实是日本，就因为有美军基地就有可能引火上身，就中国的这点制导技术，只能祈祷他炸不到居民区
总之台海战争就这个样子，我个人还是认为打不起来，起码五年内不会有事。欢迎大家讨论
最后附上美国智库的报告原链接，想更详细了解的话可以查阅
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan](https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan)
最近又有人炒作假新闻，什么”要求中共子女亲属春节前回国“，这不一眼搞笑呢？那帮人加起来得有几万人，正一手开着法拉利炸街，一手搂着烂裤裆只女享受快乐人生了，回国就没考虑过。
图我就不发了，这里引用别人的辟谣
>至少兩個明顯瑕疵：
標題不符合一貫公文習慣。
通知一般標題是「關於⋯⋯⋯的通知」。 中央軍委的全稱是「中國共產黨中央軍事委員會」，公章顯然是假的。
不过借这个机会可以简单提提台海战争
23年美国智库发了个报告，”The First Battle of the Next War——Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan“，就是讲台海战争的结果
我猜有小学文化的会问了：美国智库是啥？
>About CSIS
>关于战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）
>The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world's greatest challenges.
>战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）是一个两党制的非营利政策研究机构，致力于推进解决世界重大挑战的实用理念。
>We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development.
>我们以明确的价值观为指导——无党派立场、独立思考、创新思维、跨学科研究、诚信与专业精神，以及人才培养。
这个机构在美国历史上起到了非常大的作用，包括预测中国将参加朝鲜战争、商讨美国在阿富汗和伊拉克的撤军方案等等，非常具有参考价值
这个报告的全文特别长，165页，我就不挨个引用了，直接摘几段重点，有哪段不想看可以跳过
（有哪不同意找美国人去，我这全是引用他们的，你骂我只能证明你的文化水平和小学博士一样）
**台海战争的结果是什么？**
>In the most likely "base scenario," the Chinese invasion quickly founders.
>在最可能发生的"基本情景"中，中国的入侵很快就陷入困境。
>China's strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.
>中国对日本基地和美国水面舰艇的打击无法改变结果：台湾保持自治。
**而且还给你总结了一遍全过程**
>The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan's navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
>入侵总是以相同的方式开始：战争爆发后的最初几小时内，一轮猛烈的轰炸摧毁了台湾大部分的海军和空军。
>Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island.
>在强大火箭部队的增援下，中国海军包围了台湾，并阻止任何试图向被围困岛屿输送船只和飞机的行为。
>Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.
>数万名中国士兵乘坐军用两栖作战船只和民用滚装船渡过海峡，同时空中突击部队和空降部队在滩头后方登陆。
>However, in the most likely "base scenario," the Chinese invasion quickly founders.
>然而，在最可能发生的"基本情景"中，中国的入侵很快就陷入困境。
>Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland.
>尽管中国进行了大规模轰炸，台湾地面部队仍源源不断地涌向登陆地点，入侵者在那里艰难地补给和向内陆推进。
>Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet.
>与此同时，美国潜艇、轰炸机和战斗/攻击机，在日本自卫队的增援下，迅速重创了中国的两栖作战舰队。
**但是这只是可能性最大的一个，报告里一共进行了24次模拟，包括最乐观的和最悲观的**
**最乐观结果**
>Chinese Defeat: The Chinese amphibious fleet is mostly destroyed, and the Chinese have not taken sufficient ports or airports such that major landing operations can continue.
>中国失败：中国两栖舰队大部分被摧毁，且中国未能占领足够的港口或机场以继续进行大规模登陆作战。
>Relatively small Chinese forces are confined to a small landing area, and they are only receiving small amounts of supplies from airdrops and small civilian boats.
>相对较小的中国部队被限制在狭小的登陆区域内，他们只能通过空投和小型民用船只获得少量补给。
>At this point, it would be a matter of time for the Taiwanese forces to mop up Chinese survivors. The main challenge for the United States would not be in eliminating the remaining invaders but finding an acceptable off-ramp for hostilities.
>在这种情况下，台湾部队清剿中国残余部队只是时间问题。美国面临的主要挑战不是消灭剩余入侵者，而是找到一个可接受的结束敌对状态的方式。
**最悲观结果**
>Chinese Victory: Chinese ground forces outnumber Taiwanese forces on the island.
>中国胜利：中国地面部队在岛上的数量超过台湾部队。
>Once that happens, and the Chinese control enough airports and ports to bring the bulk of their ground forces over, they will eventually prevail, though the complete conquest of an island the size of Taiwan would take many months, barring a capitulation.
>一旦出现这种情况，且中国控制了足够的机场和港口以输送其主力地面部队，他们最终将获胜，尽管完全征服台湾这样规模的岛屿需要数月时间，除非对方投降。
>Two iterations continued until total conquest; most iterations were ended when Chinese victory appeared inevitable.
>两次模拟持续到完全征服阶段；大多数模拟在中国胜利已成定局时便告终止。
**不过也有可能出现僵持**
>Stalemate: Chinese forces have a significant lodgment ashore, and neither side can make rapid gains.
>僵持局面：中国军队在岸上建立了重要据点，双方都无法快速取得进展。
>Chinese forces have captured a handful of ports and airports. The United States is striking those facilities to make or keep them fully unusable, while China is attempting to repair them and make them fully functional.
>中国军队占领了数个港口和机场。美国持续打击这些设施使其完全无法使用，而中国则试图修复并使其恢复完全功能。
>This outcome typically occurred when China was able to secure the southern part of the island and the facilities there.
>这种结果通常出现在中国成功控制该岛南部及其设施时。
>a. Stalemate, trending toward China: China has a solid beachhead that is not in danger of being eliminated.
>a. 僵持但趋向中国优势：中国建立了稳固的滩头阵地，不存在被消灭的危险。
>They have more than three ports or airports on Taiwan, although these may be damaged.
>他们在台湾控制了超过三个港口或机场，尽管这些设施可能受损。
>To defeat the invasion, the United States and its allies would have to keep these ports and airports suppressed, resupply Taiwan, and, possibly, commit ground forces to rescue the Taiwanese position.
>要击退入侵，美国及其盟友必须持续压制这些港口和机场，为台湾提供补给，并可能需要投入地面部队来挽救台湾的战局。
>China would have to clear ports or airports with the engineers landed, possibly while under attack.
>中国则需要利用已登陆的工程部队清理港口或机场，这一过程可能在遭受攻击的情况下进行。
>b. Stalemate, indeterminate: An ambiguous situation, often involving the loss of the entire Chinese amphibious fleet, but with Chinese forces securely ashore and having occupied several damaged port or airport facilities.
>b. 僵持且局势不明：一种模糊的情况，通常涉及整个中国两栖舰队的损失，但中国军队已安全登陆并占领了几个受损的港口或机场设施。
>Resolution depends on whether China can restore the captured facilities to supply and expand its forces before Taiwanese forces counterattack in strength. The campaign would take an extended period.
>局势的解决取决于中国能否在台湾部队发动大规模反击之前恢复被占领设施以供应和扩充其部队。这场战役将持续较长时间。
>c. Stalemate, trending against China: Although the Chinese have a significant beachhead, they do not possess a favorable enough force ratio to make quick gains against opposing Taiwanese ground forces.
>c. 僵持但不利于中国：尽管中国建立了重要的滩头阵地，但他们没有足够有利的兵力比来快速突破台湾地面部队的防线。
>The Chinese amphibious fleet has suffered high attrition, and they have no working ports and airports on Taiwan.
>中国两栖舰队遭受了重大损失，他们在台湾没有可用的港口和机场。
>China is trying to substitute small civilian craft for the large amphibious carriers that it has lost, but as the British found at Gallipoli, this results in a dramatically lower supply throughput.
>中国正试图用小型民用船只替代已损失的大型两栖运输舰，但正如英国在加里波利战役中发现的那样，这会导致补给运输量大幅下降。
>An important question on the Taiwan side would include the state of its ammunition stocks and the ability to resupply. Whatever the eventual outcome, it is not where the Chinese would want to be.
>台湾方面的一个重要问题包括其弹药储备状况和补给能力。无论最终结果如何，这都不是中国希望看到的局面。
**报告里还提到了取得胜利的条件**
>The overall finding is that China is unlikely to succeed in an invasion of Taiwan in 2026 if four
>conditions hold.
>总体发现是，如果以下四个条件成立，中国在2026年不太可能成功对台湾发动进攻：
>Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.
>1. 台湾必须进行顽强抵抗。如果不这样做，其他一切都是徒劳的。
>The United States must join hostilities within days and with the full range of its capabilities.
>Delays and half measures make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, and raise the risk
>of the Chinese creating an irreducible lodgment on Taiwan.
>2. 美国必须在几天内加入战斗，并动用其全部能力。延迟和半途而废的措施会使防御更加困难，增加美国的伤亡，并提高中国在台湾建立不可消除的立足点的风险。
>The United States must have use of its bases in Japan. Without them, the United States cannot
>use its numerous fighter/attack aircraft.
>3. 美国必须能够使用其在日本的基地。没有这些基地，美国就无法使用其众多的战斗/攻击机。
>Finally, the United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.
>4. 最后，美国必须拥有足够的空射远程反舰巡航导弹。
**不过虽然取得胜利可能性很大，但也会付出惨痛的代价**
>However, even a successful defense of Taiwan comes at great cost.
>然而，即使成功保卫台湾也需要付出惨重的代价。
>The United States and its allies lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of personnel.
>美国及其盟友损失达到数十艘军舰、数百架飞机和数千名军事人员。
>The high losses would damage the United States' global position for many years.
>这些重大损失将损害美国在全球的战略地位多年。
>While Taiwan's military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a badly damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.
>虽然台湾军队尚未被击溃，但已严重受损，只能守卫一个失去电力和基本服务、经济遭受重创的岛屿。
>China's navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and thousands of soldiers are taken as prisoners or war.
>中国海军几近覆没，两栖部队的核心力量被摧毁，数千名士兵成为战俘。
**说了这么多，那现在对美军有啥建议呢？**
>Politics and Strategy
>政治与战略
>Clarify war plan assumptions
>明确战争规划的基本假设
>Avoid striking the Chinese mainland
>避免对中国大陆采取打击行动
>Prepare for heavy casualties
>为可能出现的重大伤亡做好准备
>Shift Taiwanese forces towards asymmetric capabilities
>推动台湾军事力量向非对称作战能力方向转型
>Doctrine and Posture
>军事理论与部署态势
>Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam
>强化并扩建在日本和关岛的空军基地
>Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine for aircraft survivability
>修订美国空军关于飞机生存能力的作战理论
>Avoid overflying Chinese mainland
>避免飞越中国大陆领空
>Recognize limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces
>认识到海军陆战队滨海团和陆军多域特遣队的能力局限
>Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities
>避免在危机时期进行可能造成战略弱点的部署
>Weapons and Platforms
>武器装备与作战平台
>Shift to smaller, more survivable ships
>转向发展更小型、生存能力更强的舰船
>Prioritize submarines and undersea platforms
>优先发展潜艇和水下作战平台
>Continue developing hypersonic weapons, but recognize their limitations
>继续发展高超音速武器，同时认识到其局限性
>Prioritize bomber fleet sustainment over fighters
>优先保障轰炸机机队而非战斗机的维持
>Produce more affordable fighters and balance stealth with non-stealth aircraft
>生产更具成本效益的战斗机，平衡隐身与非隐身飞机的比例
重点内容基本就在这了，你读到这基本就了解个差不多了
**全篇报告其实就一个主旨：别打**，中美台，加上提供军事基地的日，四方没一个获益的，正常人也就最多吓唬吓唬，脑子进水了才真动手
要是开打了，台湾是最惨的，直接成战场了，如果你是台湾人，看到这里可以打开谷歌，搜搜巴赫穆特，被狂轰滥炸完就是那个样子
在国内的如果你家方圆三公里没海空军的军事基地，那把心放肚子里，相信北约制导武器的精度；陆军的没事，报告里一直把打击重点放在海空军上，毕竟全国陆军现役就上百万谁能炸的完，直接把军舰炸沉让陆军渡不了海就完事了；但是随着制裁经济肯定崩溃，俄罗斯就是个例子，汽车制造业缩水80%，考虑到中国经济对外贸的依赖程度，到时候你就盼着能顿顿吃上馒头吧
美军的东亚战略部署基本报销，第七舰队可能不剩啥了，损失很大，肯定不希望开战；不过除了东亚还有很多其他的军事基地了，总体来看肯定比中国损失小
最倒霉的其实是日本，就因为有美军基地就有可能引火上身，就中国的这点制导技术，只能祈祷他炸不到居民区
总之台海战争就这个样子，我个人还是认为打不起来，起码五年内不会有事。欢迎大家讨论
最后附上美国智库的报告原链接，想更详细了解的话可以查阅
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan](https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan)
