元老串联来推倒习是否很难？看最新的经济学人这篇文章感觉很难
退休的党员干部如何在中国发出自己的声音:在习近平的领导下，他们的影响力正在减弱
宋平在20世纪80年代太年轻了，不可能被列入 "不朽者 "之列--这是当时用来描述那些尽管已经退休但仍在政治上发挥重要作用的共产党老兵的一个戏谑性术语。也许他现在配得上这个称号。105岁的他仍然健在，使他成为20多位仍然健在的前政治局常委--党的最高权力机构--中的元老。那些足够健康的人预计将出席10月16日开始的五年一次的党代会。这样的长者在今天有多重要？
像他的其他退休的大人物一样，宋先生很少在公开场合发言。因此，当他在9月向一个慈善基金会发表讲话的视频在网上出现时，在中国社交媒体和海外中文新闻网站上引起了轰动。一些人试图将其描述为对中国领导人习近平的斥责。他们引用宋先生的话说，唯一的出路是 "改革和开放"--这是邓小平在1979年发起的经济自由化的说法，在习近平的领导下，经济自由化已经倒退。这可能是一厢情愿的想法。这段录像没有提供证据表明宋先生说过这些话。即使他说了，习近平先生也用过同样的话。宋先生是著名的坚定的保守派。
不过，这段视频还是及时提醒了前领导人有可能给习近平带来麻烦，因为习近平在大会结束后将被授予第三个五年任期的党魁，这违反了退休规范。像广受尊敬的前总理朱镕基（2017年大会上的照片）这样的长者的公开批评可能会造成损害，尤其是在大会召开之前--尽管朱镕基先生已经93岁，而且据说身体不适。
目前还没有迹象表明习近平先生会受到直接挑战。但由于他继续支持俄罗斯在乌克兰的灾难性战争，并拒绝放弃使中国经济瘫痪的 "动态清零 "政策，许多精英阶层成员现在有理由对他们自己和国家的情况深感不满。许多学者、外交官和其他研究中国政治的人认为，如果习近平先生发现自己受到政治攻击，更有可能涉及长老，而不是军事政变或大规模起义。
波士顿大学的Joseph Fewsmith就是这样一位专家。"Fewsmith先生说："我认为有很多高层人士真的不喜欢习近平，而贪污政策是明显的攻击点。"我认为有一些退休的领导人可能想联合起来说些什么，这并不是不可能的事。但从逻辑上讲，这很难做到。"
在毛泽东1976年去世后的三十多年里，党的长老们掌握了相当大的权力。1982年至1992年期间，他们坐在一个正式的咨询机构中。在这个机构被取消后，一些人仍被允许查看党内最重要的秘密文件。他们定期会见外国政要。他们每年与现任领导人在北戴河的海滨度假胜地聚会，讨论政策和人事决定。至少在1997年92岁去世前的一两年，邓小平仍然具有巨大的影响力。
然而，自习近平先生2012年掌权以来，他削减了许多长者的福利，急于避免与他的前任胡锦涛一样的命运，胡锦涛的前任江泽民几乎不断插手。江泽民（他的早期统治被年迈的邓小平所掩盖）于2002年卸任党的领导人，但直到2004年仍担任军方负责人，并在此后很长一段时间内继续在幕后操纵。
习近平明确表示，他不会容忍任何此类干预。2015年，党的喉舌《人民日报》建议退休领导人 "人一走，茶就凉"，这被广泛认为是对江泽民的警告。它指责一些元老试图拉拢盟友以延长其影响力，并敦促他们 "调整心态......以免陷入无尽的麻烦"。习近平先生的反腐运动针对的是胡锦涛和江泽民的几个盟友。最引人注目的是周永康的倒台，他在2015年成为第一个被判定为腐败的前常委。对其他元老或其家庭成员进行类似调查的威胁仍然是一种强有力的威慑。
在习近平先生的领导下，党内元老被认为生活在严密的监视之下，并且必须通过党的办公厅安排公开露面和与其他高级人物会面，该办公厅目前由习近平先生的亲密盟友管理。许多最有影响力的长者现在都太老了，无法在社会上活跃。江泽民今年96岁。长期以来，他一直被传言身患重病。
然而，习近平先生今年进一步收紧了对元老的限制，这是持续关注元老的一个迹象。5月，负责管理人事的党委组织部公布了新的规定，要求退休官员，尤其是担任过领导职务的官员，不得 "任意讨论 "政策或传播 "政治上的负面言论"。
习近平先生可能允许老人们在本月的领导层洗牌中拥有有限的发言权（几位政治局委员即将退休）。在2007年和2012年的大会上，该党对200名政治局委员候选人进行了草根民意调查。但在2017年，候选人是在与在职者进行面对面访谈后选出的。国家媒体说，习近平先生还征求了57位领导人物的意见，包括长老。一位研究该党政治的中国学者说，长老们因此保留了表达意见的权利，但习先生获得了更多的回旋余地，因为他单独见了他们，并剥夺了他们加入部队或投票的机会。
该党没有确定2017年所咨询的57人。但他们被认为与一个名为 "政治局常委 "的机构密切对应，该机构在最近一次大会上有42名成员，包括政治局常委的所有退休人员。该委员会在大会上主要发挥礼仪性作用，监督议程和选举新的中央委员会。
这位中国学者说，习近平先生今年可能会使用同样的制度，因为它在2017年被誉为成功。这意味着长老们几乎肯定无法阻止习近平先生的第三个任期，但仍然可以通过提名门徒来影响新的常委会成员。习近平先生可以不理会他们。但就目前而言，他必须谨防羞辱长老们，使他们感到不得不说出来，不管后果如何。到2027年的下届大会时，这应该是一个较小的问题，因为还有几位资深长者可能已经去世。
——————
Song ping was too young in the 1980s to have been counted among the “immortals”—a jocular term used at the time to describe Communist Party veterans who were playing a big role in politics despite having retired. Perhaps he deserves the title now. At 105 years old, he is still going strong, making him the doyen of the 20 or so former members of the Politburo Standing Committee—the apex of party power—who are still alive. Those fit enough are expected to appear at a five-yearly party congress that starts on October 16th. How much do such elders matter today?
Like his fellow retired grandees, Mr Song seldom speaks in public. So when video footage of him addressing a charitable foundation emerged online in September, it caused a stir on Chinese social media and overseas Chinese news sites. Some tried to portray it as a rebuke to China’s leader, Xi Jinping. They quoted Mr Song saying that the only path forward was “reform and opening”—bywords for the economic liberalisation launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, which has regressed under Mr Xi. That is probably wishful thinking. The footage provides no evidence that Mr Song uttered those words. Even if he did, Mr Xi has used the same phrase. Mr Song is known as a staunch conservative.
Still, the episode is a timely reminder of the potential for former leaders to cause trouble for Mr Xi, who is expected to be given a third five-year term as party chief right after the congress, in breach of retirement norms. Public criticism from an elder such as the widely respected former prime minister, Zhu Rongji (pictured at the congress in 2017), could be damaging, especially just before a congress—although Mr Zhu is 93 and rumoured to be unwell.
There is no sign of a direct challenge to Mr Xi. But as he continues to support Russia over its disastrous war in Ukraine, and refuses to abandon his “zero-covid” policy that is crippling China’s economy, many members of the elite now have reason to be deeply unhappy about their own, and the country’s, circumstances. Should Mr Xi ever find himself under political attack, it is more likely to involve the elders rather than a military coup or a mass uprising, according to many academics, diplomats and others who study Chinese politics.
One such expert is Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University. “I assume there are a lot of people at very high levels who really don’t like Xi Jinping, and covid policy is the obvious attack point,” says Mr Fewsmith. “It doesn’t strike me as out of the realm of possibility that there could be a number of retired leaders who might want to coalesce and say something. But logistically it’s very hard to do.”
For more than three decades after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, party elders wielded considerable power. Between 1982 and 1992 they sat on a formal advisory body. After that was scrapped, some were still allowed to see the party’s most important secret documents. They regularly met foreign dignitaries. And they gathered annually with incumbent leaders in the beach resort of Beidaihe to discuss policy and personnel decisions. Deng remained hugely influential at least until a year or two before he died in 1997 at the age of 92.
宋平在20世纪80年代太年轻了，不可能被列入 "不朽者 "之列--这是当时用来描述那些尽管已经退休但仍在政治上发挥重要作用的共产党老兵的一个戏谑性术语。也许他现在配得上这个称号。105岁的他仍然健在，使他成为20多位仍然健在的前政治局常委--党的最高权力机构--中的元老。那些足够健康的人预计将出席10月16日开始的五年一次的党代会。这样的长者在今天有多重要？
像他的其他退休的大人物一样，宋先生很少在公开场合发言。因此，当他在9月向一个慈善基金会发表讲话的视频在网上出现时，在中国社交媒体和海外中文新闻网站上引起了轰动。一些人试图将其描述为对中国领导人习近平的斥责。他们引用宋先生的话说，唯一的出路是 "改革和开放"--这是邓小平在1979年发起的经济自由化的说法，在习近平的领导下，经济自由化已经倒退。这可能是一厢情愿的想法。这段录像没有提供证据表明宋先生说过这些话。即使他说了，习近平先生也用过同样的话。宋先生是著名的坚定的保守派。
不过，这段视频还是及时提醒了前领导人有可能给习近平带来麻烦，因为习近平在大会结束后将被授予第三个五年任期的党魁，这违反了退休规范。像广受尊敬的前总理朱镕基（2017年大会上的照片）这样的长者的公开批评可能会造成损害，尤其是在大会召开之前--尽管朱镕基先生已经93岁，而且据说身体不适。
目前还没有迹象表明习近平先生会受到直接挑战。但由于他继续支持俄罗斯在乌克兰的灾难性战争，并拒绝放弃使中国经济瘫痪的 "动态清零 "政策，许多精英阶层成员现在有理由对他们自己和国家的情况深感不满。许多学者、外交官和其他研究中国政治的人认为，如果习近平先生发现自己受到政治攻击，更有可能涉及长老，而不是军事政变或大规模起义。
波士顿大学的Joseph Fewsmith就是这样一位专家。"Fewsmith先生说："我认为有很多高层人士真的不喜欢习近平，而贪污政策是明显的攻击点。"我认为有一些退休的领导人可能想联合起来说些什么，这并不是不可能的事。但从逻辑上讲，这很难做到。"
在毛泽东1976年去世后的三十多年里，党的长老们掌握了相当大的权力。1982年至1992年期间，他们坐在一个正式的咨询机构中。在这个机构被取消后，一些人仍被允许查看党内最重要的秘密文件。他们定期会见外国政要。他们每年与现任领导人在北戴河的海滨度假胜地聚会，讨论政策和人事决定。至少在1997年92岁去世前的一两年，邓小平仍然具有巨大的影响力。
然而，自习近平先生2012年掌权以来，他削减了许多长者的福利，急于避免与他的前任胡锦涛一样的命运，胡锦涛的前任江泽民几乎不断插手。江泽民（他的早期统治被年迈的邓小平所掩盖）于2002年卸任党的领导人，但直到2004年仍担任军方负责人，并在此后很长一段时间内继续在幕后操纵。
习近平明确表示，他不会容忍任何此类干预。2015年，党的喉舌《人民日报》建议退休领导人 "人一走，茶就凉"，这被广泛认为是对江泽民的警告。它指责一些元老试图拉拢盟友以延长其影响力，并敦促他们 "调整心态......以免陷入无尽的麻烦"。习近平先生的反腐运动针对的是胡锦涛和江泽民的几个盟友。最引人注目的是周永康的倒台，他在2015年成为第一个被判定为腐败的前常委。对其他元老或其家庭成员进行类似调查的威胁仍然是一种强有力的威慑。
在习近平先生的领导下，党内元老被认为生活在严密的监视之下，并且必须通过党的办公厅安排公开露面和与其他高级人物会面，该办公厅目前由习近平先生的亲密盟友管理。许多最有影响力的长者现在都太老了，无法在社会上活跃。江泽民今年96岁。长期以来，他一直被传言身患重病。
然而，习近平先生今年进一步收紧了对元老的限制，这是持续关注元老的一个迹象。5月，负责管理人事的党委组织部公布了新的规定，要求退休官员，尤其是担任过领导职务的官员，不得 "任意讨论 "政策或传播 "政治上的负面言论"。
习近平先生可能允许老人们在本月的领导层洗牌中拥有有限的发言权（几位政治局委员即将退休）。在2007年和2012年的大会上，该党对200名政治局委员候选人进行了草根民意调查。但在2017年，候选人是在与在职者进行面对面访谈后选出的。国家媒体说，习近平先生还征求了57位领导人物的意见，包括长老。一位研究该党政治的中国学者说，长老们因此保留了表达意见的权利，但习先生获得了更多的回旋余地，因为他单独见了他们，并剥夺了他们加入部队或投票的机会。
该党没有确定2017年所咨询的57人。但他们被认为与一个名为 "政治局常委 "的机构密切对应，该机构在最近一次大会上有42名成员，包括政治局常委的所有退休人员。该委员会在大会上主要发挥礼仪性作用，监督议程和选举新的中央委员会。
这位中国学者说，习近平先生今年可能会使用同样的制度，因为它在2017年被誉为成功。这意味着长老们几乎肯定无法阻止习近平先生的第三个任期，但仍然可以通过提名门徒来影响新的常委会成员。习近平先生可以不理会他们。但就目前而言，他必须谨防羞辱长老们，使他们感到不得不说出来，不管后果如何。到2027年的下届大会时，这应该是一个较小的问题，因为还有几位资深长者可能已经去世。
——————
Song ping was too young in the 1980s to have been counted among the “immortals”—a jocular term used at the time to describe Communist Party veterans who were playing a big role in politics despite having retired. Perhaps he deserves the title now. At 105 years old, he is still going strong, making him the doyen of the 20 or so former members of the Politburo Standing Committee—the apex of party power—who are still alive. Those fit enough are expected to appear at a five-yearly party congress that starts on October 16th. How much do such elders matter today?
Like his fellow retired grandees, Mr Song seldom speaks in public. So when video footage of him addressing a charitable foundation emerged online in September, it caused a stir on Chinese social media and overseas Chinese news sites. Some tried to portray it as a rebuke to China’s leader, Xi Jinping. They quoted Mr Song saying that the only path forward was “reform and opening”—bywords for the economic liberalisation launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, which has regressed under Mr Xi. That is probably wishful thinking. The footage provides no evidence that Mr Song uttered those words. Even if he did, Mr Xi has used the same phrase. Mr Song is known as a staunch conservative.
Still, the episode is a timely reminder of the potential for former leaders to cause trouble for Mr Xi, who is expected to be given a third five-year term as party chief right after the congress, in breach of retirement norms. Public criticism from an elder such as the widely respected former prime minister, Zhu Rongji (pictured at the congress in 2017), could be damaging, especially just before a congress—although Mr Zhu is 93 and rumoured to be unwell.
There is no sign of a direct challenge to Mr Xi. But as he continues to support Russia over its disastrous war in Ukraine, and refuses to abandon his “zero-covid” policy that is crippling China’s economy, many members of the elite now have reason to be deeply unhappy about their own, and the country’s, circumstances. Should Mr Xi ever find himself under political attack, it is more likely to involve the elders rather than a military coup or a mass uprising, according to many academics, diplomats and others who study Chinese politics.
One such expert is Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University. “I assume there are a lot of people at very high levels who really don’t like Xi Jinping, and covid policy is the obvious attack point,” says Mr Fewsmith. “It doesn’t strike me as out of the realm of possibility that there could be a number of retired leaders who might want to coalesce and say something. But logistically it’s very hard to do.”
For more than three decades after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, party elders wielded considerable power. Between 1982 and 1992 they sat on a formal advisory body. After that was scrapped, some were still allowed to see the party’s most important secret documents. They regularly met foreign dignitaries. And they gathered annually with incumbent leaders in the beach resort of Beidaihe to discuss policy and personnel decisions. Deng remained hugely influential at least until a year or two before he died in 1997 at the age of 92.
"但他们被认为与一个名为 "政治局常委 "的机构密切对应，该机构在最近一次大会上有42名成员，包括政治局常委的所有退休人员。该委员会在大会上主要发挥礼仪性作用，监督议程和选举新的中央委员会。"
———————————
黨代會主席團只是禮儀性作用？這篇不用看了，毫無參考價值。
———————————
黨代會主席團只是禮儀性作用？這篇不用看了，毫無參考價值。
邓江胡从来不是民主自由的，由此可知，这些人不过是中共的一种路线，根本目的是保党，改革开放只是手段。
在邓江胡路线的烂摊子越来越重的时候，就需要新的路线来保党，这就是习近平上台的原因。
现在仍然需要习近平以不换肩的精神扛这担子，这才是中共高层的真实想法。因为支那目前面临的问题是灾难级的，越开放崩塌越快。王岐山推荐的《旧制度和大革命》正是讲的这个原理，这才是中共高层的真实想法，所以管控才越来越紧，直到撑不下去为止。
本站某些人士已经论述习近平下台将会迎来新一轮颜色革命，如果你是中共高层，你能让习近平下台吗？不过讽刺的是，这些人士反而一个劲攻击习连任的观点。典型的理想和现实分不清，理想是习下台后中共瓦解，现实是中共要避免瓦解。
为什么很多反贼会出现认知错误，就是因为他们总是认为邓江胡是好人，是民主自由的，所以一系列的推导都是建立在这个错误的基础上。
党内当然有支持继续改革开放的人，但是在整个党的决策中，这些人不如保守派能赢得更多的支持。中共统治集团仍然倾向用紧缩的办法统治支那。
蔡霞现在怎么样了，有任何回到支那的可能性吗？改开派在中共内部没有市场了。
反贼的另一个错误是认为反贼数量很多。就拿文革来说，虽然现在可以看到反毛勇士的事迹，实际上拥毛才是绝对碾压的数量级，所以反毛勇士的下场很惨。现在习近平的基本盘一样是碾压的数量级，只不过很多反贼不愿意承认。
既然习近平的基本盘如此庞大，他继续搞保守主义又有什么难事？如果他下台，普世价值观开始流行，中共立马完蛋。
在邓江胡路线的烂摊子越来越重的时候，就需要新的路线来保党，这就是习近平上台的原因。
现在仍然需要习近平以不换肩的精神扛这担子，这才是中共高层的真实想法。因为支那目前面临的问题是灾难级的，越开放崩塌越快。王岐山推荐的《旧制度和大革命》正是讲的这个原理，这才是中共高层的真实想法，所以管控才越来越紧，直到撑不下去为止。
本站某些人士已经论述习近平下台将会迎来新一轮颜色革命，如果你是中共高层，你能让习近平下台吗？不过讽刺的是，这些人士反而一个劲攻击习连任的观点。典型的理想和现实分不清，理想是习下台后中共瓦解，现实是中共要避免瓦解。
为什么很多反贼会出现认知错误，就是因为他们总是认为邓江胡是好人，是民主自由的，所以一系列的推导都是建立在这个错误的基础上。
党内当然有支持继续改革开放的人，但是在整个党的决策中，这些人不如保守派能赢得更多的支持。中共统治集团仍然倾向用紧缩的办法统治支那。
蔡霞现在怎么样了，有任何回到支那的可能性吗？改开派在中共内部没有市场了。
反贼的另一个错误是认为反贼数量很多。就拿文革来说，虽然现在可以看到反毛勇士的事迹，实际上拥毛才是绝对碾压的数量级，所以反毛勇士的下场很惨。现在习近平的基本盘一样是碾压的数量级，只不过很多反贼不愿意承认。
既然习近平的基本盘如此庞大，他继续搞保守主义又有什么难事？如果他下台，普世价值观开始流行，中共立马完蛋。
觉得元老干政很难是因为，所有外媒都觉，现任政府都是包子派系把持关键岗位，都支持包子连任。
他们完全没考虑大部份人都希望包子要滚蛋的情况下，元老要做的事并不难。
这在品葱和墙内表现的最明显，品葱觉得俄乌战争对包子杀伤大、但墙内几乎一边倒认为上海封城是最大错误。
他们完全没考虑大部份人都希望包子要滚蛋的情况下，元老要做的事并不难。
这在品葱和墙内表现的最明显，品葱觉得俄乌战争对包子杀伤大、但墙内几乎一边倒认为上海封城是最大错误。
One such expert is Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University. “I assume there are a lot of people at very high levels who really don’t like Xi Jinping, and covid policy is the obvious attack point,” says Mr Fewsmith. “It doesn’t strike me as out of the realm of possibility that there could be a number of retired leaders who might want to coalesce and say something. But logistically it’s very hard to do.”
Logistically。。。。。
不用看了，这篇文章逻辑错误到处都是，还logistically，这些人对中国政治基本盲人摸象。
Logistically。。。。。
不用看了，这篇文章逻辑错误到处都是，还logistically，这些人对中国政治基本盲人摸象。
我包稳了。下一篇。
紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯字数子书
紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯紫薯字数子书
警卫局监听控制元老完全是无稽之谈，稍微有点常识和判断力的都不会信。
作者连包总是清华博士都不知道，不用dr，一口一个mr 😂😂😂
作者连包总是清华博士都不知道，不用dr，一口一个mr 😂😂😂
一位研究该党政治的中国学者说，长老们因此保留了表达意见的权利，但习先生获得了更多的回旋余地，因为他单独见了他们，并剥夺了他们加入部队或投票的机会。
这是哪个中国学者这么牛逼
这是哪个中国学者这么牛逼
2017年，习第二任期本来就是惯例。元老们当然只得同意。然后第二步，其他人选相当于习组阁，单独一对一征求高层意见。这篇文章没有区分这两者的不同，推选“首相”和“首相组阁”。如果二十大元老们推选李克强或其他人为“首相”，那就是其他人来负责组阁。
所有外媒和情报机构自疫情开始以后，在中国基本上搞不到真正有价值的情报。
没到你死我活的地步，就一堆行将就木一屁股屎没有尿性靠死囚器官续命的老不死还想造反？
确实很难，确实没看到反对。习主席还有很多大招呢。
中共内部决定权力中枢人选的磋商机制不为人知，全中国活着的人里面，你们觉得参与介入过这个机制的人有多少？本人相信不会超过几百人。
如果这几百人里面，有人叛逃国外，那么或许能让那套机制暴露在阳光之下。
但以目前而言，无论国内国外，大家都是在雾里看花。
如果这几百人里面，有人叛逃国外，那么或许能让那套机制暴露在阳光之下。
但以目前而言，无论国内国外，大家都是在雾里看花。
记住，不流血是不会扳倒包子的！包子这次乱了纲常坏了40年的接班规矩，就是开历史的倒车，是一次党内政变，而制止包子称帝政变也只能依靠政变，以革命的政变来对抗反革命的政变，不流血是不会有结果的。而包子一旦复辟成功必然回归到原教旨马列主义，那些改开派团派江派胡派就等着被“伟大斗争”吧！
还有一部分英文原文没发出来，但是编辑不了了：
Since Mr Xi took power in 2012, however, he has curtailed many of the elders’ perks, anxious to avoid the same fate as his predecessor, Hu Jintao, who suffered almost constant meddling from his own predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Mr Jiang (whose early rule had been overshadowed by the elderly Deng) stepped down as party leader in 2002 but remained military chief until 2004 and continued to pull strings from behind the scenes long afterwards.
Mr Xi made it clear he would not tolerate any such interference. In what was widely seen as a warning to Mr Jiang in 2015, the party’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, advised retired leaders that “once people leave, the tea cools down”. It accused some elders of trying to promote allies to prolong their influence, and urged them to “adjust their mentality...so as not to fall into endless troubles”. Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted several allies of Messrs Hu and Jiang. Most striking was the downfall of Zhou Yongkang, who in 2015 became the first former Standing Committee member to be convicted of corruption. The threat of similar probes into other elders—or their family members—remains a powerful deterrent.
Under Mr Xi, party elders are thought to live under close surveillance, and to have to arrange public appearances and meetings with other senior figures through the party’s General Office, which is currently run by a close ally of Mr Xi. Many of the most influential elders are now too old to be socially active anyway. Mr Jiang is 96. He has long been rumoured to be gravely ill.
And yet in one sign of continuing concern about the elders Mr Xi tightened restrictions on them further this year. In May the party’s Organisation Department, which manages personnel, published new rules demanding that retired officials, especially those who held leadership positions, should not “arbitrarily discuss” policy or spread “politically negative remarks”.
Mr Xi may have allowed the elders a limited say in this month’s leadership shuffle (several Politburo members are due to retire). For its congresses in 2007 and 2012 the party conducted straw polls of 200 candidates for Politburo membership. In 2017, however, candidates were instead selected after face-to-face interviews with incumbents. Mr Xi also sought opinions from 57 leading figures, including elders, state media said. Elders thus retained their right to express views, but Mr Xi gained more leeway as he saw them individually and denied them a chance to join forces or vote, says a Chinese academic who studies the party’s politics.
The party has not identified the 57 people consulted in 2017. But they are thought to correspond closely with a body called the Standing Committee of the Praesidium, which had 42 members at the most recent congress, including all retirees from the Politburo Standing Committee. It plays a largely ceremonial role at the congress, overseeing the agenda and election of a new Central Committee.
Mr Xi will probably have used the same system this year, as it was hailed a success in 2017, the Chinese academic says. That means elders will almost certainly be unable to block Mr Xi’s third term but could still influence the new Standing Committee’s membership by nominating protégés. Mr Xi could ignore them. But for the moment, he must be wary of humiliating elders to a point where they feel obliged to speak out, whatever the consequences. By the next congress in 2027, that should be a lesser concern as several more senior elders may have passed on.■
Since Mr Xi took power in 2012, however, he has curtailed many of the elders’ perks, anxious to avoid the same fate as his predecessor, Hu Jintao, who suffered almost constant meddling from his own predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Mr Jiang (whose early rule had been overshadowed by the elderly Deng) stepped down as party leader in 2002 but remained military chief until 2004 and continued to pull strings from behind the scenes long afterwards.
Mr Xi made it clear he would not tolerate any such interference. In what was widely seen as a warning to Mr Jiang in 2015, the party’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, advised retired leaders that “once people leave, the tea cools down”. It accused some elders of trying to promote allies to prolong their influence, and urged them to “adjust their mentality...so as not to fall into endless troubles”. Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted several allies of Messrs Hu and Jiang. Most striking was the downfall of Zhou Yongkang, who in 2015 became the first former Standing Committee member to be convicted of corruption. The threat of similar probes into other elders—or their family members—remains a powerful deterrent.
Under Mr Xi, party elders are thought to live under close surveillance, and to have to arrange public appearances and meetings with other senior figures through the party’s General Office, which is currently run by a close ally of Mr Xi. Many of the most influential elders are now too old to be socially active anyway. Mr Jiang is 96. He has long been rumoured to be gravely ill.
And yet in one sign of continuing concern about the elders Mr Xi tightened restrictions on them further this year. In May the party’s Organisation Department, which manages personnel, published new rules demanding that retired officials, especially those who held leadership positions, should not “arbitrarily discuss” policy or spread “politically negative remarks”.
Mr Xi may have allowed the elders a limited say in this month’s leadership shuffle (several Politburo members are due to retire). For its congresses in 2007 and 2012 the party conducted straw polls of 200 candidates for Politburo membership. In 2017, however, candidates were instead selected after face-to-face interviews with incumbents. Mr Xi also sought opinions from 57 leading figures, including elders, state media said. Elders thus retained their right to express views, but Mr Xi gained more leeway as he saw them individually and denied them a chance to join forces or vote, says a Chinese academic who studies the party’s politics.
The party has not identified the 57 people consulted in 2017. But they are thought to correspond closely with a body called the Standing Committee of the Praesidium, which had 42 members at the most recent congress, including all retirees from the Politburo Standing Committee. It plays a largely ceremonial role at the congress, overseeing the agenda and election of a new Central Committee.
Mr Xi will probably have used the same system this year, as it was hailed a success in 2017, the Chinese academic says. That means elders will almost certainly be unable to block Mr Xi’s third term but could still influence the new Standing Committee’s membership by nominating protégés. Mr Xi could ignore them. But for the moment, he must be wary of humiliating elders to a point where they feel obliged to speak out, whatever the consequences. By the next congress in 2027, that should be a lesser concern as several more senior elders may have passed on.■
蘆笛對20大看法也很悲觀
【前段见网上嚷嚷什么“习下李上”，什么“沈阳兵变”等等。我看了心里只能嘿嘿冷笑。
我早就说过，人的智力定向不同，“狡猾”与“聪明”是两回事，只有中国人才分不清这两者。别看小习治国无方，弄权可是绝对有术。他早在修改“宪法”前就把枪杆子和刀把子都牢牢地攥在手里，用“反腐”这把利刃顶在全体高官的背上，成功地劫持了我党。而正如李南央女士所披露的，我党那些高官，哪怕贵为政治局委员，都是怂包软蛋，只会乖乖屈服。所以，没有什么“反习势力”，作这种春梦的同志还是洗洗睡吧。】
【前段见网上嚷嚷什么“习下李上”，什么“沈阳兵变”等等。我看了心里只能嘿嘿冷笑。
我早就说过，人的智力定向不同，“狡猾”与“聪明”是两回事，只有中国人才分不清这两者。别看小习治国无方，弄权可是绝对有术。他早在修改“宪法”前就把枪杆子和刀把子都牢牢地攥在手里，用“反腐”这把利刃顶在全体高官的背上，成功地劫持了我党。而正如李南央女士所披露的，我党那些高官，哪怕贵为政治局委员，都是怂包软蛋，只会乖乖屈服。所以，没有什么“反习势力”，作这种春梦的同志还是洗洗睡吧。】
经济学人一向不对领导人选举听床，或发表倾向性意向，这篇很罕见。
经济学人封面上了好几个关于吾皇的重口味作品
之前的皇上不记得有哪怕一张封面
这个杂志看来对包皇，绝对真爱
之前的皇上不记得有哪怕一张封面
这个杂志看来对包皇，绝对真爱