艾恩·兰德-不要混淆两种资本主义

Ayn Rand - Don't Confuse the Two Kinds of Capitalism

excerpts from "The Robber Barons" by Ayn Rand:

艾恩·兰德(Ayn Rand)的“强盗贵族”节选:



There is a very important confusion. What we have to distinguish between are, the capitalist industrialists who operate on the free market and the kind of capitalists who operate with government help.

现在人们有一个非常值得重视的混淆。 我们必须区别的是:在自由市场上运作的资本家/工业家和在政府帮助下运作的资本家。



Since the United States has been a mixed economy from the beginning, not a truly free capitalist country, but merely the freest up to that point in history, there were government controls and government interference into the economy from the beginning -- only these controls were marginal and minimal and were not able, at first, to hamper the magnificent progress of this country.

由于美国从一开始就是混合经济体,不是真正的自由资本主义国家,而只是历史上到那个时间为止最自由的国家,所以从一开始就有政府控制和政府干预经济,但是一开始这些控制只是边际的和微不足道的,所以没有阻碍美国的辉煌发展。

Now, there are two ways to get rich and only two. One, is to produce your wealth and trade with other people by voluntary trade to mutual benefit. Or, acquire wealth by force. To acquire it by force, one must be either an actual criminal or a legalized criminal. That is, a man who uses the power of government to grant him special privileges, not possessed by his competitors, and thus acquire wealth by legalized force; by the force of law.

世上只有两种致富的途径。第一种是自己生产财富然后根据互惠互利原则跟别人交易(这里请参考主觀價值理論)。或者就是用武力获取。用武力获取的人有实际的犯罪犯或者是合法的犯罪犯。合法的发罪犯就是利用政府的权力授予他自己竞争者没有的特殊特权, 进而通过合法的暴力获取财富。这是法律的暴力。



Well, both kinds of capitalists existed in this country from the beginning, and this is the crucial point: all of the evils popularly ascribed to capitalists, and to capitalism in the 19th century, were actually committed by government interference into the economy, by those capitalists who were not free enterprisers, who did not function by free market competition and did not rise by merit, or not by merit exclusively; but, predominantly and primarily by government help.

这两种资本家从一开始就存在于这个美国。这是关键的一点:普遍归因于资本家和19世纪资本主义的所有邪恶实际上都是政府干预经济所造成的, 是由那些不是自由企业家的资本家,是由那些没有通过自由市场竞争成功,没有以能力或仅以能力来成功, 而是反而主要依靠政府帮助才成功的资本家造成的。

The best example of this situation existed in the history of the railroads. The railroad which aroused the greatest popular resentment -- with some justice, was the Central Pacific of California, now known as the Southern Pacific. This was one of the two railroads built by government subsidies. This was the first transcontinental railroad. in the 19th century, the government gave subsidies to the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific, two private groups, to create a transcontinental railroad, building from both ends of the continent. In both cases, the main motive of the men involved in building this railroad -- though not the exclusive but the main motive -- was to acquire the subsidies, not to build a railroad. more than that, there was yet no economic need for a transcontinental railroad. There was not enough freight to carry to justify private investment. But the government, under propaganda similar to today's -- and such excuses as the prestige of the country -- decided to build a railroad and it did so by means of giving subsidies to private groups.

这种情况的最好例子是铁路的历史。当时引起人们最大的反感的铁路名叫加利福尼亚中太平洋铁路公司,现在被称为南太平洋铁路公司。这是政府补贴修建的两条铁路之一。这是第一条美国跨洲铁路。在19世纪,政府补贴了两个私人团体联合太平洋铁路公司(Union Pacific)和中太平洋铁路公司(Central Pacific),以在美洲的两端建造一条横贯大陆的铁路。在这两种情况下,参与修建这条铁路的人的主要动机-尽管不是唯一的动机,是获得这个补贴而不是修建铁路。不仅如此,当时横贯大陆的铁路还没有经济需求。没有足够的货运来证明私人投资的合理性。但是政府在与今天类似的宣传--这是为了美国国家的声望--的借口下决定修建这个铁路,并通过向私人团体提供补贴的方式进行了建设。

Now, this is a classic example of a capitalist of a mixed economy. That is, a man who rises not by merit and economic judgment but by government pull and special privilege. The builders of this continental railroad had an advantage which no private competitor could match. They had government subsidies. As a consequence, the Central Pacific held a monopoly in the state of California for about 30 years. Not only did they have the original advantage, but controlling and bribing the legislature of California, they had laws passed which forbade the entry of any competitor into California. To be exact, the law forbade any competing railroad to enter any California port, and since most of the freight traffic came through the port, it meant that no railroad could survive economically in the state of California if it did not have access to the port.

这是混合经济里的资本家的一个的经典例子。 就是说,一个不是靠自己能力和经济判断力,而是靠政府的扶持和特殊特权而成功的人。 这条大陆铁路的建设者具有一个没有竞争对手能比拟的优势。 他们有政府补贴。结果,中太平洋在加利福尼亚州垄断了大约30年。 他们不仅拥有原始优势,而且控制并贿赂了加利福尼亚州的立法机关,并且通过了法律,禁止任何竞争对手进入加利福尼亚州。 确切地说,该法律禁止任何竞争的铁路进入加利福尼亚的任何港口,并且由于大部分货运量都是通过该港口来的,这意味着如果没有进入港口的铁路,竞争的铁路公司在加利福尼亚州就无法在经济上生存下来 。



Several attempts were made by competing private companies to break the monopoly of the Central Pacific in California, and, of course, they failed. Now , the Central Pacific engaged in truly immoral and improper economic practices. Namely, they changed their freight rates arbitrarily every year, charging as much as the farmers produced, leaving them practically nothing as profit and barely and seed for the next harvest. Now, the statist collectivist intellectuals, of course, blamed the railroad, private industry. The famous novel by Frank Norris, “Octopus”, denouncing the railroads, was based on the activity of the Central Pacific, and was the foundation for the enormous popular hatred of railroads. Yet observe. Who was the villain in the picture? Not private enterprise, not the free market, but an act of government -- originally the subsidies of the federal government and then reinforced by the legislation of California, which maintained the monopoly of the Central Pacific and permitted it to engage in all such abuses, delivering the public into its power. It is an act of Government. Special privilege is required to establish any kind of coercive monopoly and the history of the Central Pacific is a classic example of it. It was the government and the legislature that was guilty of the abuses involved. Instead of identifying this fact, it was free enterprise, the free market, that took the blame.

竞争的私人公司为打破加利福尼亚中央太平洋的垄断地位进行了几次尝试,但都失败了。中太平洋铁路公司采取了真正的不道德和不正当的经济做法。就是说,他们每年都随意改变运费,农民生产了多少他们就收多少,使农民们几乎没有利润,下一次收获也几乎没有种子。集体主义国家主义的知识分子然将责任归咎于铁路这个私营企业。弗兰克·诺里斯(Frank Norris)著名的小说《八达通》(Octopus)谴责了铁路,该小说以中央太平洋的活动为基础,是人们对铁路的巨大仇恨的基础。但是仔细观察,谁是这里真正的恶人?不是私有企业,不是自由市场,而是政府的行为: 最初是联邦政府的补贴,然后通过加利福尼亚州的立法得到加强,加利福尼亚州的立法保持了中太平洋的垄断地位,进而导致了其从事所有此类恶劣行为,在群众头上施威。 这是政府的行为。建立任何类型的强制性垄断都需要特殊特权,而中太平洋的历史就是典型的例子。涉及滥用职权的是政府和立法机关。然而与其发现这一事实,人们却将责任归咎于自由企业,自由市场。



If it is asked whether it is a question of dishonest legislators, it is not. The issue there is that no legislator who has the power of control can be either honest or dishonest. The dishonesty lies not in the person, but in the institution. When a government holds arbitrary power over the economy, no matter what the controls and regulations, they will necessarily be unjust because they would necessarily be weighted by force in favor of one group of people at the expense of the others.

如果问到这是否是不可信的立法者的问题,这不是。问题在于,没有任何一个拥有控制权的立法者是可信的或者不可信的。可不可信不在于单个的立法者,而在于制度。当政府对经济拥有任意权力时,无论采取何种控制和法规,它们都必然是不公正的,因为它们必然会用暴力做出牺牲一部分人来帮助另外一部分人的举动来。



The proper lesson to have learned should have been the realization that government controls can create only harm, injustice and distortions in the economy and should be repealed. The government should not have had the power to interfere into the economy; it should not have held economic power but, since it did and so long as it did, the abuses necessarily had to take place with each control leading to further and more disastrous controls. To this day, people have not yet grasped that lesson and whenever anything goes wrong in any industry, it is always the free market, the free capitalist that takes the blame and. I stress this without exception, if you investigate you will always find that the source of the evils or the abuses was the government -- government controls, not free enterprisers or the free market.

应当吸取的正确教训是,认识到政府的管制措施只会在经济中造成损害,不公正和扭曲,应予以废除。 政府不应该有干预经济的权力。它本来不应该拥有经济实力,但是,既然它拥有了权力,并且只要它拥有了这种权力,恶行就必然会随着控制发生,从而又必然会导致进一步和更灾难性的控制。直到今天,人们还没有掌握这一教训,任何行业中任何出现问题的地方,总是要由自由市场,自由资本家来负责。我无一例外地强调这一点:如果您进行调查,您总会发现邪恶或虐待的根源总是政府:政府控制,而不是自由的企业家或自由市场。

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分享 2020-04-03

28 个评论

政府帮助的资本家 任正非啊 描绘中国太合适了
政府帮助的资本家 任正非啊 描绘中国太合适了

中国所有资本家本质都是白手套。这篇文章对中国没有实际意义,对美国也是不切实际的 Libertarian教条,我光看标题都能猜出来是谁发的
兄弟,这个论坛主要由三种人构成的,进步主义者(或现代自由主义者、反共毛左/西马等),保守主义者(或基督教基要主义者、美国国家主义者等),姨学家等Dark Enlightenment反共者(法西斯主义者、汉族种族主义者、斯宾格勒主义者等),还有一些介于前两者、后两者之间的各类Alt-right、Centrist(保守自由主义、自由保守主义等)。
你天天发这种无政府版本的Libertarianism,跟上述派别实在是缺乏重叠啊...(哪怕你发新自由主义或左翼的版本都会有更多人在意)
你好,我是新来的,请问这里的马列毛左派和libertarian哪个更多一些

这里没几个毛左,有不少libertarian,不过也有很多社民
经济里一些资源存在很大的正外部性,比如教育,科研,公共设施。完全的自由市场不能很好地将资本向这些正外部性的资源倾斜,使得社会的总收益和总效用比政府调控的情况要差。

这是政府调控经济一个非常重要的合法性来源
经济里一些资源存在很大的正外部性,比如教育,科研,公共设施。完全的自由市场不能很好地将资本向这些正外...


经济活动有外部性是对的,但这无法得出只有政府主导才是更有效做法的结论。我们现在看到的是,最好的一些教育机构和科研技术实力最强的一些企业机构都不是政府主导的。而且,越是政府干涉程度高的国家,其教育和科研的水平就越落后于市场自由度相对高的国家。这些证据显然不支持政府干预能更有效的观点。我没找到任何严谨详细的研究有充分证据说明政府调控任何资源可以获得更好的效用。

如果政府具备将某种具备外部性的资源进行最有效分配的能力,那么是什么原因使它们不能把这种能力运用到所有资源上呢?目前观察到的事实是,政府并没有具备将任何资源进行最有效运用的能力,自由市场可能时不时会跳帧,但市场不完美不代表政府或其它实体能做更好。
经济里一些资源存在很大的正外部性,比如教育,科研,公共设施。完全的自由市场不能很好地将资本向这些正外...


关于positive externalities,Milton Friedman所著的Free To Choose中有一个很好的例子,我建议你看一下,这个例子是关于大学是如何向富翁售卖慈善建筑来获得基金的,如果你看一下美国现在有多少大学,图书馆,博物馆,奖学金,基金会,等等是以19世纪末到20世纪初的富翁命名的,你就会感觉到这个机制是多么的有效:

In one respect this picture of private colleges and universities
is oversimplified. In addition to schooling, they produce and sell
two other products: monuments and research. Private individuals
and foundations have donated most of the buildings and facilities
at private colleges and universities, and have endowed professorships and scholarships. Much of the research is financed out of
income from endowments or out of special grants from the federal government or other sources for particular purposes. The
donors have contributed out of a desire to promote something
they regard as desirable. In addition, named buildings, professorships, and scholarships also memorialize an individual, which
is why we refer to them as monuments.
The combination of the selling of schooling and monuments
exemplifies the much underappreciated ingenuity of voluntary co￾operation through the market in harnessing self-interest to broader
social objectives. Henry M. Levin, discussing the financing of
higher education, writes, "[Iit is doubtful whether the market
would support a Classics department or many of the teaching pro￾grams in the arts and humanities that promote knowledge and
cultural outcomes which are believed widely to affect the general
quality of life in our society. The only way these activities would
be sustained is by direct social subsidies," by which he means
government grants." Mr. Levin is clearly wrong. The market—
broadly interpreted—has supported social activities in private
institutions. And it is precisely because they provide general bene-
fits to society, rather than serving the immediate self-interest of
the providers of funds, that they are attractive to donors. Suppose
Mrs. X wants to honor her husband, Mr. X. Would she, or anyone else, regard it as much of an honor to have the ABC Manufacturing enterprise (which may be Mr. X's real monument and
contribution to social welfare) name a newly built factory for
him? On the other hand, if Mrs. X finances a library or other
building named for Mr. X at a university, or a named professorship or scholarship, that will be regarded as a real tribute to
Mr. X. It will be so regarded precisely because it renders a public
service.
Students participate in the joint venture of producing teaching,
monuments, and research in two ways. They are customers, but
they are also employees. By facilitating the sale of monuments
and research, they contribute to the funds available for teaching,
thereby earning, as it were, part of their way. This is another
example of how complex and subtle are the ways and potentiali￾ties of voluntary cooperation.
Many nominally government institutions of higher learning are
in fact mixed. They charge tuition and so sell schooling to stu￾dents. They accept gifts for buildings and the like and so sell
monuments. They accept contracts from government agencies or
from private enterprises to engage in research. Many state univer￾sities have large private endowments—the University of California
at Berkeley, the University of Michigan, the University of Wis￾consin, to name only a few. Our impression is that the educational
performance of the institution has in general been more satisfac￾tory, the larger the role of the market.
Equity. Two justifications are generally offered for using tax
money to finance higher education. One, suggested above by
Mr. Levin, is that higher education yields "social benefits" over
and above the benefits that accrue to the students themselves; the
second is that government finance is needed to promote "equal
educational opportunity."
(i) Social benefits. When we first started writing about higher
education, we had a good deal of sympathy for the first justifica￾tion. We no longer do. In the interim we have tried to induce the
people who make this argument to be specific about the alleged
social benefits. The answer is almost always simply bad economics.
We are told that the nation benefits by having more highly
skilled and trained people, that investment in providing such
skills is essential for economic growth, that more trained people
raise the productivity of the rest of us. These statements are
correct. But none is a valid reason for subsidizing higher education. Each statement would be equally correct if made about
physical capital (i.e., machines, factory buildings, etc.), yet
hardly anyone would conclude that tax money should be used to
subsidize the capital investment of General Motors or General
Electric. If higher education improves the economic productivity
of individuals, they can capture that improvement through higher
earnings, so they have a private incentive to get the training.
Adam Smith's invisible hand makes their private interest serve
the social interest. It is against the social interest to change their
private interest by subsidizing schooling. The extra students—
those who will only go to college if it is subsidized are precisely
the ones who judge that the benefits they receive are less than
the costs. Otherwise they would be willing to pay the costs themselves.

另外当代很多Youtuber的运营形式是另外一种方法,由patroen捐款来制作免费的youtube视频,再由免费的youtube视频吸引更多观众,更多的观众里的一个很小的subset又会成为新的patroen,以此循环。

总之the general idea就是在提供“社区服务”的时候捆绑着给一小部分人卖“特殊服务”,这样就可以在自由市场里promote social good。
经济活动有外部性是对的,但无法得出只有政府主导才是更有效的做法。我们现在看到的是,最好的一些教育机构...


你说的大体上我都认同,但我认为需要有一个主体来干预自由市场,不知道你认不认同?

这个主体不一定是政府,可以是NGO,你说的大学,或者Google这样的大公司。政府的优势在于它专门设计出来处理各种经济问题,社会问题,NGO之类的更像是政府的补充。但政府经常没能发挥出预期的效果,我认为还是权力隔离地不够彻底。即使是美国的三权分立,联邦制,也无法保证政府的任何部门不越权。
关于positive externalities,Milton Friedman所著的Free To...


我没看完你中间那段英文,不过我大概知道你的意思。这些自发运转的机制很有效,但不能适用于任何情况。比如环境污染的限制和治理,反垄断调查,两个城市之间的交通建设这些,依然需要一个主体去实施,我回复本楼另一个人说的,这个主体不一定是政府,可以是一些NGO什么的,只不过政府本身就是被设计用来处理这些问题的一个主体。
Ah, 這篇文章讓我回到剛上大學時所接觸的ANCAP理論。雖然我還是個Minarchist 
问题在于实际情况是,你控制不了你的对手,如果你的对手采取国家资本主义以国家体量直接参与市场竞争,完全的自由资本主义就是门户洞开不设防的,你就没法和桂枝竞争。
我没看完你中间那段英文,不过我大概知道你的意思。这些自发运转的机制很有效,但不能适用于任何情况。比如...


但是政府做的时候是垄断的,如果是政府机构和市场机制同时存在的话,像对于FDA的话允许第三方私人检查公司,对于Social Security的话允许第三方投资基金,对于公立教育和医疗的话可以搞点绢(voucher),但是在美国我上面说的这些政府全部不允许,政府一旦做就是只有他自己一直做,导致搞得很低效腐败。
你说的大体上我都认同,但我认为需要有一个主体来干预自由市场,不知道你认不认同?这个主体不一定是政府,...

接着我之前的回复说,我的建议就是政府监督机构和私营监督机构同时存在与市场上,继续用FDA的例子来说的话,就是医药品/食物生产商可以选择让FDA或者其他的NGO来认证他的产品。而消费者看到包装就可以知道这个产品是由谁认证的。如果某些消费者对第三方机构完全没有信心的话,它可以只买FDA认证的东西,而某些更冒险的顾客(或者没有其他选择的,比方说新出了一种没有被FDA认证过的心脏救助机,而病人需要这个来就心脏病;上世纪70年代的时候欧洲出的一个救助机就是这样没有被FDA认证在美国一直不能上市)就可以选择其他的认证机构,这样互相制衡的话,我觉得会更好。
问题在于实际情况是,你控制不了你的对手,如果你的对手采取国家资本主义以国家体量直接参与市场竞争,完全...


竞争什么?桂枝压榨自己的人民给美国生产廉价商品,美国人乐还乐不过来呢。当然失业工人不高兴,但是消费者整体来说是受益的。你想的设防难道是想搞Mercantalism?
[quote][/quote]
先亏本倾销占领市场是很常见的模式,以国家为后盾自然可以把这种模式最大化。支那的经济和政治是一体的,你这种理想化的做法只会让支那控制全世界。

举个例子,很多国家明知华为有安全风险还是用华为,就是因为价格够低,支那的目的可以根本不在赚钱而是窃取信息,那么自然可以不断补贴亏本卖,这种情况只能靠政府干预。

你的理想状态是完全不考虑政治的。
先亏本倾销占领市场是很常见的模式,以国家为后盾自然可以把这种模式最大化。的经济和政治是一体的,你这种...


well,你如果以国家安全的角度来考虑的话我这样确实不好,但那样的话应该所有战略物资都在本土有储备,在和平时期到底应该弄多少,什么产业弄,才能做到平衡,这也很难考虑。
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合理情况是不同国家不同考虑,如果像支那这种国家政经一体,那么也自然应该把所有来自支那的商业行为视为政治行为,在这方面美国不是做得太多,而是远远不够。
你说的大体上我都认同,但我认为需要有一个主体来干预自由市场,不知道你认不认同?这个主体不一定是政府,...


我赞同的确应该有各种各样的形式的参与,能形成更完善的自由市场机制,不管是NGO还是盈利性机构公司,都是市场参与的一份子,彼此之间互相协作互相补充互相竞争,最终使市场中的资源运作更有效。

理论上我不赞同干预市场,因为目前没有发现比市场更有效的方式来做决策进行资源分配。做决策依赖于信息,信息存在于市场,要证明干预市场的合理性需要先证明这个干预者本身比市场更了解资源的供需和流通的信息。目前没有任何实体可以做到这一点,因为所有实体都不可能获得全部信息并用不具偏向性的方式进行资源分配,政府也不行。

而且,政府在我看来就是最需要警惕的存在,作为权力实体,政府天生就具有扩大权力的倾向性,要是允许这样的实体去干预市场,结果很可能是灾难性的...比如计划经济惨剧。我反对政府干预市场,政府本身的存在就已经是大问题,如果它们是必须存在的话。
合理情况是不同国家不同考虑,如果像这种国家政经一体,那么也自然应该把所有来自的商业行为视为政治行为,...


是的,这个假想的讨论里并没有假设出现中国这种流氓的问题。

自由市场就像有规则的牌桌,大家按规则玩牌,比赛实力(和运气),有输有赢很正常,经济活动更可能合作多赢,很不错。

但就像你说的,突然来了个人不按规则玩,作弊出老千还腐蚀其它牌手一起勾结出老千怎么办?这种情况下,为了保护自由市场不被这家伙毁掉,为了大家还能继续正常玩,就只能先弄清楚这个人是不是新来的不懂规则,有教化的可能,如果能听会学肯进步,那还是欢迎学会规则之后一起玩(这就是美国之前帮中国加入WTO的原因);但是如果ta像中国这样心里都明白故意捣乱占别人便宜怎么进一步处理?

很简单:干TA。

干掉TA之后大家还能继续正常玩,但如果对它绥靖甚至和它一起出千使诈,那整个世界都会被拖到坑里。(这个就不知道现在自由世界什么时候能真的看清了
接着我之前的回复说,我的建议就是政府监督机构和私营监督机构同时存在与市场上,继续用FDA的例子来说的...


你说得很对,政府需要面临竞争的压力。它的任何部门,包括它本身都有被替代的可能,这样才能制衡政府对于扩张权力的欲望,促进自身效率的改良
讲得很好,我非常赞同这篇文章对于政府的态度!可能因为我也是少数派吧XDDD
”欧洲、美国对于中国的态度,不是太严酷,而是太纵容“这才讲到了问题的根本,以中国的国家式公司,威权+资本,根本不应该允许其参与任何全球化的正常贸易之中,否则就是对其他自由竞争的公司的不公平。政府唯一该做的就是把中国这种国家牢牢排除在外,同时监督本国公司是否偷偷和中国合作,毕竟资本家靠不住,他们可以卖掉勒死自己的绳索。在没有保证公平的情况下就开始游戏,是当年允许中国加入wto的欧美绥靖官僚的错误。
ZetaFC 观察 回复 grseaf
讲得很好,我非常赞同这篇文章对于政府的态度!可能因为我也是少数派吧XDDD”欧洲、美国对于中国的态度...

嗯,虽然我能理解你仇恨中共的情绪。但是中共对市场的垄断只是在国内,在西方市场即使是中国的国企也只不过是一个成功的大型公司罢了,对自由市场没有影响。中国这些政府控制的恶果是在中国境内的,相当于奴役自己的国民廉价地给西方生产商品,西方高兴还来不及呢。
嗯,虽然我能理解你仇恨中共的情绪。但是中共对市场的垄断只是在国内,在西方市场即使是中国的国企也只不过...

这个观点是错的中共企业本身对市场的参与就在破坏规则,这个规则主要体现在破坏分工上,举个例子中共在国内对西方制度文化的攻击降低了中国人对西方产品的需求,人为导致了西方的失业问题
这个观点是错的中共企业本身对市场的参与就在破坏规则,这个规则主要体现在破坏分工上,举个例子中共在国内...

中国不买西方产品只是让西方在贸易里得到了更少的好处,并没有对西方作恶。就像不贸易的话是零,平等贸易是10的话,中共这样的西方就获利5。结果上来说还是对西方有利的。你如果不能理解这个的话说明你对自由贸易如何运作没有认知
中国不买西方产品只是让西方在贸易里得到了更少的好处,并没有对西方作恶。就像不贸易的话是零,平等贸易是...

中国不买西方商品主要原因是政府对媒体的垄断性宣传,这种当然是作恶本质是政府垄断媒体煽动仇恨的一种表现,这种情况实际上西方获利是负的,你不懂博弈论也不懂自由贸易的基础

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