所谓的去美元化之人民币成为巴西第二大外储
https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-economy-fx/yuan-tops-euro-as-brazils-second-currency-in-foreign-reserves-idUSL1N3632DU
魔鬼都在细节里
Until 2018, the yuan was absent from Brazil’s foreign reserves and now accounts for 5.37% of Brazilian central bank holdings at the end of 2022, surpassing the euro’s 4.74% share.
The U.S. dollar continues to dominate, comprising 80.42% of Brazil’s total foreign reserves in 2022.
Brazil’s total foreign reserves fell to $324.70 billion in 2022 due to a 7.45% drop in portfolio returns, caused by rising interest rates in the United States and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar against other currencies
魔鬼都在细节里
Until 2018, the yuan was absent from Brazil’s foreign reserves and now accounts for 5.37% of Brazilian central bank holdings at the end of 2022, surpassing the euro’s 4.74% share.
The U.S. dollar continues to dominate, comprising 80.42% of Brazil’s total foreign reserves in 2022.
Brazil’s total foreign reserves fell to $324.70 billion in 2022 due to a 7.45% drop in portfolio returns, caused by rising interest rates in the United States and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar against other currencies
4 个评论
这篇文章对于美元地位动摇也讲的非常好 值得一看
https://www.barrons.com/articles/dollar-china-petro-yuan-saudi-b0b6e48f
The financial shocks that keep hitting the dollar haven’t shaken its role in the world economy. The reasons matter. The dollar may not be eternal. But it won’t be China that knocks it down.
The confiscation of Russia’s central bank reserves and potential plans to use them to help Ukraine were thought to cut the dollar’s attractiveness. The U.S.’s increasing reliance on sanctions and weaponizing access to the dollar have escalated the talk of alternatives. The banking failures in the U.S. renewed questions about its susceptibility to destabilizing financial crises. Meanwhile, China’s ties with Saudi Arabia have led to speculation of a petro-yuan that displaces the petrodollar.
There are two ways the dollar could lose its place in the world economy: encroachment, in which another currency supplants the dollar, as the dollar replaced sterling a century ago, or abdication, where the U.S. pursues policies that shrink back from the global role it previously sought. Concerns about China fall into the encroachment camp, but little substance exists. The more significant threat is self-immolation. Those who see the dollar’s role as an exorbitant burden, not a privilege, want to abandon it. That would be a type of financial disarmament in the great game of international influence that extends beyond prices and quantities.
China may be Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer, but there’s no sign that Saudi Arabia will price oil in yuan. It makes no sense on several levels, including that the Saudi riyal is pegged to the dollar. When the Federal Reserve changes interest rates, the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority and several other Middle Eastern countries typically quickly match the move.
The Chinese yuan is simply not convertible. It isn’t a question of technology but policy. China’s foreign-exchange rate is closely managed and purposefully opaque. Its capital markets are developing but aren’t sufficiently transparent. Including the yuan in the International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights in 2015 was supposed to spark growth in yuan reserves, but as of the end of the third quarter of 2022, the yuan’s share of international reserves was about 2.75%. The yuan’s share of Swift transactions briefly rose above 3% early last year, but by February 2023, its share had slumped to about 2.2%.
Listening to some U.S. commentary about a rising yuan, you’d get the sense that America is being victimized. But China has hardly abandoned the dollar. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, once considered a challenge to the World Bank, has struck a cooperative accord with it. The AIIB takes U.S. dollar subscriptions and has been joined by U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Israel.
Even China’s Belt and Road Initiative, seen as a power projection exercise, cannot be divorced from the dollar. Initially, China made yuan loans, but recipients quickly swapped into dollars. So now, Chinese banks finance BRI loans with dollars.
Moreover, focusing on how oil transactions are denominated confuses the key to the dollar’s role in the world economy. It also misunderstands what has happened over the past 40 years. Put simply, if crudely, the market for money outstrips the market for goods by magnitudes.
The Bank for International Settlements estimates that the daily turnover in the foreign-exchange market is $7.5 trillion daily. Global trade for all of last year was about $32 trillion. The dollar is on one side of 88% of currency trades, little changed from 1989 (when the dollar was one part of 90% of currency trades). China may be the most important trade partner for more countries than the U.S., but the dollar’s role remains paramount.
The pricing of oil and many other commodities in dollars isn’t the cause of the greenback’s role in the world economy but a reflection of it. The U.S. capital markets’ depth, breadth, and transparency are its bedrock and are overlaid by its military dominance and legal system.
Nor is the diversification of reserves toward the euro, sterling, yen, or Canadian and Australian dollars a threat to the dollar. The financial sanctions on Russia were imposed broadly, if not universally, and those countries and regions are deeply entrenched in the dollar-centric world. Also, as technology has improved and reduced the barriers to entry, several new payment systems have arisen over the past couple of years. They are small and fragmented.
U.S. sanctions have created niche opportunities for unlikely alternatives, including the United Arab Emirates’ dirham, which India has begun using to pay for Russian oil. India, not China, has emerged as the largest buyer of Russian oil, and New Delhi wants to avoid the yuan, given the rivalry.
Yet the yuan’s sphere of influence is poised to expand. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization drove eastward after the Soviet Union collapsed, China’s BRI extended its reach into the soft underbelly of central Asia. And now it seems that Russia will be in the yuan’s orbit as a cost of Putin’s Ukraine folly. Chinese companies have moved into the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western companies. At best, a yuan bloc is in the early stages of forming to include Russia, North Korea, and Iran. They didn’t quit the dollar bloc but were fired from it. The fate of the dollar lies in Washington, not Beijing.
Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron’s and MarketWatch newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit commentary proposals and other feedback to ideas@barrons.com.
https://www.barrons.com/articles/dollar-china-petro-yuan-saudi-b0b6e48f
The financial shocks that keep hitting the dollar haven’t shaken its role in the world economy. The reasons matter. The dollar may not be eternal. But it won’t be China that knocks it down.
The confiscation of Russia’s central bank reserves and potential plans to use them to help Ukraine were thought to cut the dollar’s attractiveness. The U.S.’s increasing reliance on sanctions and weaponizing access to the dollar have escalated the talk of alternatives. The banking failures in the U.S. renewed questions about its susceptibility to destabilizing financial crises. Meanwhile, China’s ties with Saudi Arabia have led to speculation of a petro-yuan that displaces the petrodollar.
There are two ways the dollar could lose its place in the world economy: encroachment, in which another currency supplants the dollar, as the dollar replaced sterling a century ago, or abdication, where the U.S. pursues policies that shrink back from the global role it previously sought. Concerns about China fall into the encroachment camp, but little substance exists. The more significant threat is self-immolation. Those who see the dollar’s role as an exorbitant burden, not a privilege, want to abandon it. That would be a type of financial disarmament in the great game of international influence that extends beyond prices and quantities.
China may be Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer, but there’s no sign that Saudi Arabia will price oil in yuan. It makes no sense on several levels, including that the Saudi riyal is pegged to the dollar. When the Federal Reserve changes interest rates, the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority and several other Middle Eastern countries typically quickly match the move.
The Chinese yuan is simply not convertible. It isn’t a question of technology but policy. China’s foreign-exchange rate is closely managed and purposefully opaque. Its capital markets are developing but aren’t sufficiently transparent. Including the yuan in the International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights in 2015 was supposed to spark growth in yuan reserves, but as of the end of the third quarter of 2022, the yuan’s share of international reserves was about 2.75%. The yuan’s share of Swift transactions briefly rose above 3% early last year, but by February 2023, its share had slumped to about 2.2%.
Listening to some U.S. commentary about a rising yuan, you’d get the sense that America is being victimized. But China has hardly abandoned the dollar. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, once considered a challenge to the World Bank, has struck a cooperative accord with it. The AIIB takes U.S. dollar subscriptions and has been joined by U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Israel.
Even China’s Belt and Road Initiative, seen as a power projection exercise, cannot be divorced from the dollar. Initially, China made yuan loans, but recipients quickly swapped into dollars. So now, Chinese banks finance BRI loans with dollars.
Moreover, focusing on how oil transactions are denominated confuses the key to the dollar’s role in the world economy. It also misunderstands what has happened over the past 40 years. Put simply, if crudely, the market for money outstrips the market for goods by magnitudes.
The Bank for International Settlements estimates that the daily turnover in the foreign-exchange market is $7.5 trillion daily. Global trade for all of last year was about $32 trillion. The dollar is on one side of 88% of currency trades, little changed from 1989 (when the dollar was one part of 90% of currency trades). China may be the most important trade partner for more countries than the U.S., but the dollar’s role remains paramount.
The pricing of oil and many other commodities in dollars isn’t the cause of the greenback’s role in the world economy but a reflection of it. The U.S. capital markets’ depth, breadth, and transparency are its bedrock and are overlaid by its military dominance and legal system.
Nor is the diversification of reserves toward the euro, sterling, yen, or Canadian and Australian dollars a threat to the dollar. The financial sanctions on Russia were imposed broadly, if not universally, and those countries and regions are deeply entrenched in the dollar-centric world. Also, as technology has improved and reduced the barriers to entry, several new payment systems have arisen over the past couple of years. They are small and fragmented.
U.S. sanctions have created niche opportunities for unlikely alternatives, including the United Arab Emirates’ dirham, which India has begun using to pay for Russian oil. India, not China, has emerged as the largest buyer of Russian oil, and New Delhi wants to avoid the yuan, given the rivalry.
Yet the yuan’s sphere of influence is poised to expand. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization drove eastward after the Soviet Union collapsed, China’s BRI extended its reach into the soft underbelly of central Asia. And now it seems that Russia will be in the yuan’s orbit as a cost of Putin’s Ukraine folly. Chinese companies have moved into the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western companies. At best, a yuan bloc is in the early stages of forming to include Russia, North Korea, and Iran. They didn’t quit the dollar bloc but were fired from it. The fate of the dollar lies in Washington, not Beijing.
Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron’s and MarketWatch newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit commentary proposals and other feedback to ideas@barrons.com.
确实没有必要担心美元的世界货币地位，而人民币想成为替代美元的储备货币地位更不可能。
美元能成为世界货币，按美联储自己的解释：有五大原因
1、美国的国内经济规模
2、美国经济在国际贸易中的影响力
3、美元的易兑换程度
4、美国国内金融市场的规模和开放性和流动性，比如美债市场
5、美国的经济政策
除了第5点会有很多质疑外，其他4点是有量化依据的。
用这5点去衡量欧元，只有第4点是欧元区不具备的。而这一点又非常重要。像中国通过贸易顺差，积累了大量的美元，这些美元最稳妥的投资渠道就是美债了，所以中国的外汇储备大部分都是美债的形式存在的。
而欧元就没有同样规模的收益稳定的债券市场了。它的吸引力就不如美元了。
而人民币，则更缺乏这样的市场了。
人民币另外一个致命弱点就是不可自由兑换，无论是对冲风险，还是投资保值，缺乏灵活性
而且人民币汇率是官方控制的，容易被官方干预，对于持币者来讲，风控难度增加。
另外从贸易的角度看，人民币很难成为储备货币。美元作为世界货币，美国经济付出的代价，就是长年贸易逆差、国内需求降低、失业率为此增加。有些经济学家，认为美元没有必要承担这么大的责任，如果美元在全球外汇储备的比例下降，对美国经济有好处。所以人民币要想成为主流外储货币，相应的代价是中国经济不可承受的。
中国是属于重商主义经济，保持贸易顺差，增加国家财富是它的特征。出口多，赚的美元就多。反过来，要想让人民币成为别国储备货币，中国就得进口多，用人民币买别国的产品，或者对外进行投资。这样中国国国内的消费需求就得下滑，出口也会减少，国内的失业率会增加
同时为了让提升人民币的作为外储吸引力，要维持一个较高的利率。这对国内的出口更加不利，同时对国内经济也会抑制。
所以人民币成为外储货币，不能光想着面子上的事儿，还要看经济能否承受。没有哪个金刚钻，揽不了瓷器活。
美元能成为世界货币，按美联储自己的解释：有五大原因
1、美国的国内经济规模
2、美国经济在国际贸易中的影响力
3、美元的易兑换程度
4、美国国内金融市场的规模和开放性和流动性，比如美债市场
5、美国的经济政策
除了第5点会有很多质疑外，其他4点是有量化依据的。
用这5点去衡量欧元，只有第4点是欧元区不具备的。而这一点又非常重要。像中国通过贸易顺差，积累了大量的美元，这些美元最稳妥的投资渠道就是美债了，所以中国的外汇储备大部分都是美债的形式存在的。
而欧元就没有同样规模的收益稳定的债券市场了。它的吸引力就不如美元了。
而人民币，则更缺乏这样的市场了。
人民币另外一个致命弱点就是不可自由兑换，无论是对冲风险，还是投资保值，缺乏灵活性
而且人民币汇率是官方控制的，容易被官方干预，对于持币者来讲，风控难度增加。
另外从贸易的角度看，人民币很难成为储备货币。美元作为世界货币，美国经济付出的代价，就是长年贸易逆差、国内需求降低、失业率为此增加。有些经济学家，认为美元没有必要承担这么大的责任，如果美元在全球外汇储备的比例下降，对美国经济有好处。所以人民币要想成为主流外储货币，相应的代价是中国经济不可承受的。
中国是属于重商主义经济，保持贸易顺差，增加国家财富是它的特征。出口多，赚的美元就多。反过来，要想让人民币成为别国储备货币，中国就得进口多，用人民币买别国的产品，或者对外进行投资。这样中国国国内的消费需求就得下滑，出口也会减少，国内的失业率会增加
同时为了让提升人民币的作为外储吸引力，要维持一个较高的利率。这对国内的出口更加不利，同时对国内经济也会抑制。
所以人民币成为外储货币，不能光想着面子上的事儿，还要看经济能否承受。没有哪个金刚钻，揽不了瓷器活。
一直也没太当回事，人民币的信用体系和价值体系都不足以与美元抗衡，自始至终都是美元附庸而已。人民币国际化我一直是当网红话题看的。
常说这两年是中国打台湾的机会窗口
也差不多这样
98%和 99%失败概率的区别
也差不多这样
98%和 99%失败概率的区别