中国的崛起正在逆转
（转自电报群）英文原文：https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-s-rise-as-an-economic-superpower-is-reversing-20231120-p5el85#:~:text=Then%20the%20reversal%20began.,the%20largest%20since%20the%201960s. 或：
https://twitter.com/FT/status/1726239522084585716 或：
https://www.ft.com/content/c10bd71b-e418-48d7-ad89-74c5783c51a2
中国🇨🇳崛起正在逆转
作者是洛克菲勒国际的主席
Financial Times FT 周末 20.11.2023
在历史性的转折中，中国🇨🇳作为经济超级大国的崛起正在逆转。过去半个世纪最大的全球故事可能已经结束。
在20世纪60年代和70年代在🇨🇳毛泽东的领导下停滞不前后，中国于20世纪80年代向世界开放——并在随后的几十年里起飞。它在全球经济中的份额从1990年的2%以下上升到2021年的18.4%，增长了近十倍。到目前为止，从来没有一个国家崛起得如此之快。
然后逆转开始了。2022年，中国在世界经济中的份额略有萎缩。今年，它将大幅萎缩，达到17%。两年来1.4%的跌幅是自20世纪60年代以来最大的一次。
这些数字以“名义”美元表示——未根据通货膨胀进行调整——这是最准确地捕捉一个国家相对经济实力的措施。中国🇨🇳旨在恢复16世纪至19世纪初的帝国地位，当时其在世界经济产出中的份额达到三分之一的峰值，但这一目标可能正在失去实现。
中国🇨🇳的衰落可能会重组世界。自20世纪90年代以来，该国在全球GDP中的份额主要以牺牲欧洲和日本为代价，这些国家的份额在过去两年中或多或少保持稳定。中国🇨🇳留下的空白主要由美国🇺🇸和其他新兴国家填补。
为了说明这一点，预计2022年和2023年世界经济将增长8万亿美元，达到105万亿美元。中国将不占这些收益，美国将占45%，其他新兴国家将占50%。新兴国家的一半收益将来自其中五个国家：🇮🇳印度、印度尼西亚🇮🇩，墨西哥🇲🇽，巴西🇧🇷和波兰🇵🇱，这是未来可能发生权力转移的惊人迹象。
此外，按名义价值计算，中国在世界GDP中所占份额的下滑并非基于独立或外国来源。名义数字作为其官方GDP数据的一部分发布。因此，中国的崛起正在因北京自己的原因而逆转。
这在很大程度上被忽视的一个原因是，大多数分析师专注于实际GDP增长，这是经通胀调整的。通过创造性地调整通货膨胀，北京长期以来一直设法报告说，实际增长正在稳步达到其官方目标，目前约为5%。这似乎每个季度都证实了“东方正在崛起”的官方故事。但中国的实际长期潜在增长率——新工人进入劳动力的总和每个工人的产出——现在更像是2.5%。
中国🇨🇳持续的婴儿萧条已经将其在世界工作年龄人口中所占的比例从24%的峰值降至19%，预计在未来35年内将降至10%。随着世界工人比例的缩小，增长份额的较小几乎是肯定的。
此外，在过去十年中，中国🇨🇳政府变得更加干涉，对于一个发展中国家来说，其债务具有历史意义。这些力量正在减缓生产力的增长，以每个工人的产出来衡量。这种结合——工人减少，以及工人人均产出增长萎靡不振——将使中国🇨🇳难以开始夺回全球经济份额。
按名义美元计算，中国🇨🇳的GDP有望在2023年下降，这是自1994年人民币大幅贬值以来的第一次。鉴于实际GDP增长的限制，未来几年，北京只能在通货膨胀或人民币价值飙升的情况下重新获得全球份额——但两者都不太可能。中国是少数遭受通货紧缩的经济体之一，它还面临债务驱动的房地产萧条，这通常会导致当地货币贬值。
投资者正在以创纪录的速度撤出中国，增加了对人民币的压力。外国人在第三季度削减了对中国工厂和其他项目的投资120亿美元，这是自创纪录开始以来的首次此类下降。当地人经常在外国人之前逃离陷入困境的市场，他们也在离开。中国投资者正在以异常快的速度进行外向投资，并为房地产交易在世界各地徘徊。
中国🇨🇳习近平过去曾表示，对历史正在向国家有利转变，没有什么能阻止其崛起。他在上周🇺🇸旧金山峰会上拜登和美国首席执行官的会面确实暗示了其减低的腔调，或者至少承认中国🇨🇳仍然需要外国商业伙伴。但几乎无论习近平🇨🇳做什么，在可预见的未来，他的国家🇨🇳在全球经济中的份额都可能会下降。
现在是一个后中国🇨🇳世界。☠️
英文：
China’s rise as an economic superpower is reversing
China’s real long-term growth rate — the sum of new workers entering the labour force and output per worker — is now more like 2.5 per cent. The biggest story of the past half century may be over.
Ruchir Sharma， Writer and investor
Nov 20, 2023 – 9.26am
In a historic turn, China’s rise as an economic superpower is reversing. The biggest global story of the past half century may be over.
After stagnating under Mao Zedong in the 1960s and 70s, China opened to the world in the 1980s – and took off in subsequent decades. Its share of the global economy rose nearly tenfold from below 2 per cent in 1990 to 18.4 per cent in 2021. No nation had ever risen so far, so fast.
Then the reversal began. In 2022, China’s share of the world economy shrank a bit. This year it will shrink more significantly, to 17 per cent. That two-year drop of 1.4 per cent is the largest since the 1960s.
These numbers are in “nominal” dollar terms – unadjusted for inflation – the measure that most accurately captures a nation’s relative economic strength. China aims to reclaim the imperial status it held from the 16th to early 19th centuries, when its share of world economic output peaked at one-third, but that goal may be slipping out of reach.
China’s decline could reorder the world. Since the 1990s, the country’s share of global GDP grew mainly at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have seen their shares hold more or less steady over the past two years. The gap left by China has been filled mainly by the US and by other emerging nations.
To put this in perspective, the world economy is expected to expand by $US8 trillion ($12.3 trillion) in 2022 and 2023 to $US105 trillion. China will account for none of that gain, the US will account for 45 per cent, and other emerging nations for 50 per cent.
Half the gain for emerging nations will come from just five of these countries: India, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil and Poland. That is a striking sign of possible power shifts to come.
Moreover, China’s slipping share of world GDP in nominal terms is not based on independent or foreign sources. The nominal figures are published as part of their official GDP data. So China’s rise is reversing by Beijing’s own account.
One reason this has gone largely unnoticed is that most analysts focus on real GDP growth, which is inflation-adjusted. And by adjusting creatively for inflation, Beijing has long managed to report that real growth is steadily hitting its official target, now around 5 per cent. This in turn appears to confirm, every quarter, the official story that “the east is rising”.
But China’s real long-term potential growth rate – the sum of new workers entering the labour force and output per worker – is now more like 2.5 per cent.
The ongoing baby bust in China has already lowered its share of the world working age population from a peak of 24 per cent to 19 per cent, and it is expected to fall to 10 per cent over the next 35 years. With a shrinking share of the world’s workers, a smaller share of growth is almost certain.
Further, over the past decade, China’s government has grown more meddlesome, and its debts are historically high for a developing country. These forces are slowing growth in productivity, measured as output per worker. This combination – fewer workers, and anaemic growth in output per worker – will make it difficult in the extreme for China to start winning back share in the global economy.
In nominal dollar terms, China’s GDP is on track to decline in 2023, for the first time since a large devaluation of the renminbi in 1994. Given the constraints to real GDP growth, in the coming years Beijing can only regain global share with a spike in inflation or in the value of the yuan – but neither is likely.
China is one of the few economies suffering from deflation, and it also faces a debt-fuelled property bust, which typically leads to a devaluation of the local currency.
Investors are pulling money out of China at a record pace, adding to pressure on the yuan. Foreigners cut investment in Chinese factories and other projects by $US12 billion in the third quarter – the first such drop since records begin. Locals, who often flee a troubled market before foreigners do, are leaving too. Chinese investors are making outward investments at an unusually rapid pace and prowling the world for real estate deals.
President Xi Jinping has in the past expressed supreme confidence that history is shifting in China’s favour, and nothing can stop its rise. His meetings with President Joe Biden and US chief executives at last week’s summit in San Francisco did hint at moderation, or at least a recognition that China still needs foreign business partners.
But almost no matter what Xi does, his nation’s share in the global economy is likely to decline for the foreseeable future. It’s a post-China world now.
—— The writer is chairman of Rockefeller International.
https://twitter.com/FT/status/1726239522084585716 或：
https://www.ft.com/content/c10bd71b-e418-48d7-ad89-74c5783c51a2
中国🇨🇳崛起正在逆转
作者是洛克菲勒国际的主席
Financial Times FT 周末 20.11.2023
在历史性的转折中，中国🇨🇳作为经济超级大国的崛起正在逆转。过去半个世纪最大的全球故事可能已经结束。
在20世纪60年代和70年代在🇨🇳毛泽东的领导下停滞不前后，中国于20世纪80年代向世界开放——并在随后的几十年里起飞。它在全球经济中的份额从1990年的2%以下上升到2021年的18.4%，增长了近十倍。到目前为止，从来没有一个国家崛起得如此之快。
然后逆转开始了。2022年，中国在世界经济中的份额略有萎缩。今年，它将大幅萎缩，达到17%。两年来1.4%的跌幅是自20世纪60年代以来最大的一次。
这些数字以“名义”美元表示——未根据通货膨胀进行调整——这是最准确地捕捉一个国家相对经济实力的措施。中国🇨🇳旨在恢复16世纪至19世纪初的帝国地位，当时其在世界经济产出中的份额达到三分之一的峰值，但这一目标可能正在失去实现。
中国🇨🇳的衰落可能会重组世界。自20世纪90年代以来，该国在全球GDP中的份额主要以牺牲欧洲和日本为代价，这些国家的份额在过去两年中或多或少保持稳定。中国🇨🇳留下的空白主要由美国🇺🇸和其他新兴国家填补。
为了说明这一点，预计2022年和2023年世界经济将增长8万亿美元，达到105万亿美元。中国将不占这些收益，美国将占45%，其他新兴国家将占50%。新兴国家的一半收益将来自其中五个国家：🇮🇳印度、印度尼西亚🇮🇩，墨西哥🇲🇽，巴西🇧🇷和波兰🇵🇱，这是未来可能发生权力转移的惊人迹象。
此外，按名义价值计算，中国在世界GDP中所占份额的下滑并非基于独立或外国来源。名义数字作为其官方GDP数据的一部分发布。因此，中国的崛起正在因北京自己的原因而逆转。
这在很大程度上被忽视的一个原因是，大多数分析师专注于实际GDP增长，这是经通胀调整的。通过创造性地调整通货膨胀，北京长期以来一直设法报告说，实际增长正在稳步达到其官方目标，目前约为5%。这似乎每个季度都证实了“东方正在崛起”的官方故事。但中国的实际长期潜在增长率——新工人进入劳动力的总和每个工人的产出——现在更像是2.5%。
中国🇨🇳持续的婴儿萧条已经将其在世界工作年龄人口中所占的比例从24%的峰值降至19%，预计在未来35年内将降至10%。随着世界工人比例的缩小，增长份额的较小几乎是肯定的。
此外，在过去十年中，中国🇨🇳政府变得更加干涉，对于一个发展中国家来说，其债务具有历史意义。这些力量正在减缓生产力的增长，以每个工人的产出来衡量。这种结合——工人减少，以及工人人均产出增长萎靡不振——将使中国🇨🇳难以开始夺回全球经济份额。
按名义美元计算，中国🇨🇳的GDP有望在2023年下降，这是自1994年人民币大幅贬值以来的第一次。鉴于实际GDP增长的限制，未来几年，北京只能在通货膨胀或人民币价值飙升的情况下重新获得全球份额——但两者都不太可能。中国是少数遭受通货紧缩的经济体之一，它还面临债务驱动的房地产萧条，这通常会导致当地货币贬值。
投资者正在以创纪录的速度撤出中国，增加了对人民币的压力。外国人在第三季度削减了对中国工厂和其他项目的投资120亿美元，这是自创纪录开始以来的首次此类下降。当地人经常在外国人之前逃离陷入困境的市场，他们也在离开。中国投资者正在以异常快的速度进行外向投资，并为房地产交易在世界各地徘徊。
中国🇨🇳习近平过去曾表示，对历史正在向国家有利转变，没有什么能阻止其崛起。他在上周🇺🇸旧金山峰会上拜登和美国首席执行官的会面确实暗示了其减低的腔调，或者至少承认中国🇨🇳仍然需要外国商业伙伴。但几乎无论习近平🇨🇳做什么，在可预见的未来，他的国家🇨🇳在全球经济中的份额都可能会下降。
现在是一个后中国🇨🇳世界。☠️
英文：
China’s rise as an economic superpower is reversing
China’s real long-term growth rate — the sum of new workers entering the labour force and output per worker — is now more like 2.5 per cent. The biggest story of the past half century may be over.
Ruchir Sharma， Writer and investor
Nov 20, 2023 – 9.26am
In a historic turn, China’s rise as an economic superpower is reversing. The biggest global story of the past half century may be over.
After stagnating under Mao Zedong in the 1960s and 70s, China opened to the world in the 1980s – and took off in subsequent decades. Its share of the global economy rose nearly tenfold from below 2 per cent in 1990 to 18.4 per cent in 2021. No nation had ever risen so far, so fast.
Then the reversal began. In 2022, China’s share of the world economy shrank a bit. This year it will shrink more significantly, to 17 per cent. That two-year drop of 1.4 per cent is the largest since the 1960s.
These numbers are in “nominal” dollar terms – unadjusted for inflation – the measure that most accurately captures a nation’s relative economic strength. China aims to reclaim the imperial status it held from the 16th to early 19th centuries, when its share of world economic output peaked at one-third, but that goal may be slipping out of reach.
China’s decline could reorder the world. Since the 1990s, the country’s share of global GDP grew mainly at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have seen their shares hold more or less steady over the past two years. The gap left by China has been filled mainly by the US and by other emerging nations.
To put this in perspective, the world economy is expected to expand by $US8 trillion ($12.3 trillion) in 2022 and 2023 to $US105 trillion. China will account for none of that gain, the US will account for 45 per cent, and other emerging nations for 50 per cent.
Half the gain for emerging nations will come from just five of these countries: India, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil and Poland. That is a striking sign of possible power shifts to come.
Moreover, China’s slipping share of world GDP in nominal terms is not based on independent or foreign sources. The nominal figures are published as part of their official GDP data. So China’s rise is reversing by Beijing’s own account.
One reason this has gone largely unnoticed is that most analysts focus on real GDP growth, which is inflation-adjusted. And by adjusting creatively for inflation, Beijing has long managed to report that real growth is steadily hitting its official target, now around 5 per cent. This in turn appears to confirm, every quarter, the official story that “the east is rising”.
But China’s real long-term potential growth rate – the sum of new workers entering the labour force and output per worker – is now more like 2.5 per cent.
The ongoing baby bust in China has already lowered its share of the world working age population from a peak of 24 per cent to 19 per cent, and it is expected to fall to 10 per cent over the next 35 years. With a shrinking share of the world’s workers, a smaller share of growth is almost certain.
Further, over the past decade, China’s government has grown more meddlesome, and its debts are historically high for a developing country. These forces are slowing growth in productivity, measured as output per worker. This combination – fewer workers, and anaemic growth in output per worker – will make it difficult in the extreme for China to start winning back share in the global economy.
In nominal dollar terms, China’s GDP is on track to decline in 2023, for the first time since a large devaluation of the renminbi in 1994. Given the constraints to real GDP growth, in the coming years Beijing can only regain global share with a spike in inflation or in the value of the yuan – but neither is likely.
China is one of the few economies suffering from deflation, and it also faces a debt-fuelled property bust, which typically leads to a devaluation of the local currency.
Investors are pulling money out of China at a record pace, adding to pressure on the yuan. Foreigners cut investment in Chinese factories and other projects by $US12 billion in the third quarter – the first such drop since records begin. Locals, who often flee a troubled market before foreigners do, are leaving too. Chinese investors are making outward investments at an unusually rapid pace and prowling the world for real estate deals.
President Xi Jinping has in the past expressed supreme confidence that history is shifting in China’s favour, and nothing can stop its rise. His meetings with President Joe Biden and US chief executives at last week’s summit in San Francisco did hint at moderation, or at least a recognition that China still needs foreign business partners.
But almost no matter what Xi does, his nation’s share in the global economy is likely to decline for the foreseeable future. It’s a post-China world now.
—— The writer is chairman of Rockefeller International.
